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In June 1995, a riot erupted at a crowded immigration detention facility in
Elizabeth, New Jersey. The riot was sparked by the anger of more than 315
detainees who had endured months of deplorable conditions while confined
there awaiting the outcome of their requests for political asylum. Among other
things, the detainees allegedly had been arbitrarily beaten, strip-searched, and
placed in solitary confinement; provided with soiled clothing, bad food, and
forced to sleep with the lights on; and had seen their money, jewelry, and legal
documents confiscated. 1 The uprising, which federal officials later described as
the worst disturbance ever at a privately run immigration jail,2 took over five
hours to quell. Afterwards, the Immigration and Naturalization Service closed
down the facility, citing poor management. The facility had been operated by a
private corporation hired by the federal government.
In 1975, an aircraft owned and operated by the United States Air Force
crashed while in the process of airlifting children out of Vietnam. One hundred
fifty-five people died, including many orphans of American servicemen who
themselves had been killed in combat. In subsequent litigation3 filed by the
estates and survivors of the decedents, the company that had designed and built
the aircraft was blamed for causing the tragedy, through what the plaintiffs
characterized as its knowing failure to correct numerous "grossly defective"
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I See Matthew Purdy & Celia W. Dugger, Legacy of Immigrans' Uprising: New Jail
Operator, Little Change, N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1996, at Al.
2 See id.
3 See Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1289 (D.D.C. 1986) (approving
$10 million settlement to victims and their estates).
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and "obvious" mechanical and structural deficiencies. 4 The private company
had built the aircraft under a contract with the United States Air Force.
From 1960 to 1972, experiments were conducted on at least eighty-seven
people with cancer in which those patients, a majority of whom were racial
minorities, were exposed to total or partial radiation without their informed
consent. The tests were aimed at determining the psychological and
physiological effects of excessive radiation exposure on humans. The radiation
exposure caused bone marrow failure, pain, nausea, bums, and it cut short the
lives of the unwitting test subjects. The experiments were designed and
conducted by private researchers who had received funding under federal
contracts and had been loosely supervised by two federal officials.5
On an early morning in June 1992, a teenage boy in a small Alabama city
was killed when the car that he was driving in an unmarked road construction
area hit a trench, lost control, and struck two large trees. The contractor that
had been working on the site had left trenches in the road as big as three feet
wide and up to eight inches deep. The teenager's parents sued the road
contractor for wrongful death.6 At trial the jury heard evidence that the
defendant's superintendent had been made specifically aware of the dangers
posed by the holes in the road prior to the accident, but had responded at the
time: "I'm tired of the bitching about the road. We're going to take the
cheapest way out."7 The contractor was a private enterprise that had been hired
by the city to perform the roadwork.
All of the above scenarios involve, to the extent the reported facts are true,
what may be described as egregious behavior. In each of those instances the
wrongful behavior in question centrally includes conduct by government
contractors. Persons injured by that conduct sued the private contractors (at
times also naming as defendants the government itself and various public
officials) to obtain redress. Through such litigation, the private entities that had
been engaged to carry out the public's business and to fulfill public needs could
have been held accountable for their failures.
4 See id. at 1293.
5 See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(denying defendants' motions to dismiss). The case eventually settled for $4.25 million.
6 See Lemond Constr. Co. v. Wheeler, 669 So. 2d 855 (Ala. 1995) (upholding $3.5
million punitive damages verdict against road contractor).
7 Id. at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority of the Alabama Supreme
Court relied on this evidence to support their conclusion that there was ample proof that the
defendant had engaged in sufficiently "wanton" conduct to justify the punitive damages
award, id. at 862-63; a dissenting justice found the evidence only indicative of negligent
conduct and also concluded that the court below had failed to take into proper account the
plaintiff's contributory negligence, see id. at 866-70 (Houston, J., dissenting).
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The accountability of government contractors takes on heightened
importance in a time when it has become more commonplace for government
agencies to "privatize" parts of their activities through contracts. As public
entities continue-for reasons of efficiency, political philosophy, or otherwise-
to spin off more and more of their functions to private enterprises, the need to
monitor such enterprises in their handling of those public duties elevates.
Unlike elected politicians, private contractors are at least one step removed
from the democratic process and are apt to be more attentive to their own
bottom-line financial success than they are to catering to the popular will. For a
host of reasons, government itself is prone to do an inadequate job in
supervising those hired firms. Accordingly, litigation brought by persons whom
government contractors have injured can help discourage the kind of
irresponsible contractor behavior depicted in the above scenarios.
A significant issue that arises in private lawsuits against government
contractors is the proper scope of liability and how those liability principles
might or should differ from those that apply to the government itself. If the
government had directly engaged in the conduct at issue, it might be protected
from liability as a matter of law under various facets of sovereign immunity.
Sometimes the law has derivatively extended those immunities to private parties
acting as agents of the government, treating such agents like the sovereign itself
for certain liability purposes. 8
There is a well-developed body of law that speaks to these liability matters,
detailing the circumstances in which government contractors can be deemed
civilly responsible to either the public agencies that hire them (under contract
law)9 or, alternatively (under tort or other legal doctrines), to third parties
harmed in some way by the contractor's behavior. 10 Less well-developed,
8 See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
9 See generally JOHN CIBMINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMMSITRAHON OF
GOvERNMENT CoNTRAcrs 901-96, 1239-1316 (3d ed. 1995) (surveying law concerning
terminations of federal contractors in default and the resolution of agency and contractor
disputes); JOHN CosGROv MCBRIDE, GOvERNMENT CoNmnAcrs: CYcLoPnilc GumE TO
LAW, ADMINISTRATON, PROCEDURE cbs. 31, 33, 35A, 39 (1996) (discussing government
contract breaches, reprocurement, terminations for contractor default, and various defenses).
10 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513-14 (1988) (applying so-
called "government contractor defense" to limit liabilities of government contractors to
injured third parties). There tends to be much more focus on the legal relationships between
government and its contractors inter sese than about such contractors' duties to members of
the public. For example, a 578-page reference book published in 1993 about federal
contractor law devotes a full 98-page chapter to remedies of the contractor against the
government and of the government against the contractor, but only tangentially refers to
private litigation against such contractors in an eight page discussion of the False Claims Act.
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however, is the law that specifies the appropriate remedy to redress the
contractor's misfeasance or nonfeasance." In particular, the theoretical focus
here is aimed at one strand in that bundle of potential remedies: punitive
damages. This Article specifically examines whether a government contractor
can and should be liable for such punitive damages to a third party that it has
harmed in the course of its work for the public, in situations where the
contractor's behavior is willful, wanton, or otherwise sufficiently extreme to
satisfy the usual legal standards for awarding such exemplary relief.
Public entities have been frequently insulated by the notion, expressed both
in statutes and case law, that the remedy of punitive damages may not be
assessed against the government itself. 12 This traditional, albeit not universal,
punitive damages immunity is founded upon both substantive and fiscal
rationales arguably unique to governmental defendants.' 3 But when the
defendant actor is not the sovereign but rather a private, profit-maximizing
enterprise under contract to the sovereign, should that immunity from punitive
damages be stretched further to cover the contractor? For reasons explored in
this Article (and which have yet to be well developed in any extant case law,
statutory provisions, or scholarship), such immunity ought not be shared with
government contractors. To the contrary, exposing government contractors to
punitive damages under the same terms that they are exposed to such liabilities
for egregious conduct in their everyday private sector affairs can help foster the
essential goal of accountability-accountability not only to the government, but
also to the very public that is supposed to benefit when a public function is
privatized. The prospect of such exemplary liability should strengthen the legal
incentives for profit-seeking government contractors to do the public's work
properly.
Part I of this Article initially examines the current trend toward
privatization and explains why the accountability of the private entities that are
See JOHN W. WHELAN, UNDERSrANDING FEDERAL GovERNMENr CoNTRACrs 559-67
(1993).
11 For example, McBride's comprehensive multivolume treatise on government
contracts devotes only two of its 53 chapters to damages, and virtually all of that discussion
concerns the damages recoverable by the government from a contractor or by a contractor
from the government. See McBRIDE, supra note 9, cbs. 32, 34; see also CIBmnc & NAsH,
supra note 9, at 1191-1209 (focusing "remedies" section in reference book upon contractor
remedies and government remedies rather than upon third-party remedies); GOvERNMENT
CoNTRAcr LAw: TE DEsKBOOK FOR PROCUREMENT PROFESSIONALS (ABA Section of
Public Contract Law, 1995) 275-93, 377-85, 403-18 (devoting only two pages of a 436-page
"deskbook" on government contracts (pages 415-16) to the role of private suits against
contractors under False Claims Act, with no discussion of other private theories of recovery).
12 See supra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
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hired to perform "outsourced" public functions is of special importance. Before
specifically evaluating punitive damages as a potential accountability enhancing
device in such privatized contexts, two separate concepts are explored in Parts
II and I and then brought together in Part IV. Part II reviews the
government's own liability or immunity under civil law principles when it
causes harm to others. That discussion also examines circumstances where
private contractors hired by the government have received, by extension, some
of the sovereign's immunity protections. Part m then addresses the general
rationale for imposing punitive damages on private sector actors, as contrasted
with the traditional immunity of public entities from such penalties. Finally,
Part IV blends those analyses to answer the central question posed herein:
whether private entities engaged in contracted out governmental activities
should derivatively share the sovereign's immunity from punitive liability.
I. OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENTAL NEEDS AND SERvIcES:
THm DRwvE TO PRVAnZE
A. The Expanding Use of Government Contracts
Public officials in the United States have increasingly been looking to
contract with the private sector to carry out all or parts of certain activities
customarily performed by public employees. 14 This interest in privatizing
services and other governmental functions through contracts has escalated at all
levels of government. The United States is expanding its already immense
procurement role, moving to contract out-either for the first time or on a more
frequent basis-such diverse items as facilities and equipment, data processing,
training, regulatory inspections, and even background investigations on
appointees to certain federal offices. 15 States are privatizating, inter alia,
14 A recent study by the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public Health and
International Affairs determined that about 30% of government services throughout the
United States are carried out via private contractors. See Mark Platte, Angling for a Piece of
the Action, L.A. Tom, May 4, 1995, at Al (reporting on University of Pittsburgh study);
see also Rowan Miranda & Karlyn Andersen, Alternative Service Delivery in Local
Government: 1982-92, MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 26 (1994) (detailing results of national
surveys by International City/County Management Association in 1982 and 1992 of more
than 4900 United States cities and counties and finding that the outsourcing of functions to
private vendors through government contracts was a popular and widespread alternative to the
delivery of many public services by local government employees).
15 Privatization at the federal level has largely proceeded under what is known as Office
and Management Circular A-76. This document, first issued in 1966, admonishes federal
agencies, subject to some major exceptions, to use outside contractors for commercial
services where doing so would be at least 10% less expensive than if those services were
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prisons, recreational facilities, transportation, and various social services.16
Cities and other localities are likewise outsourcing public works, health care,
directly provided by the government. See Performance of Commercial Activities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 14,338, 14,338-46 (1996) (re-adopting and amending in other respects, 0MB Circular
A-76); see also Janet Rothenberg Pack, The Opportunities and Constraints of Privatization, in
PRiVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATnvES 281, 296-98 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991).
Since 1993, Vice President Gore has headed an ongoing process known as the National
Performance Review (NPR), which has been studying ways to "re-invent" the federal
government through making agencies and programs more efficient and more focused on
serving the needs of their "customers." Some of the NPR's recommendations have included
the full or partial privatization of various federal governmental operations. See, e.g., AL
GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKs BETrER AND CoSrs LEss 56-94 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 NPR
REPORT] (recommending, among other things, eliminating the Government Printing Office's
monopoly on printing for federal agencies; allowing federal agencies to lease space directly
through private real estate companies; contracting out National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's nautical charting work to private firms; contracting out noncore Defense
Department functions such as data processing, billing, and payroll; contracting out Job Corps
training centers that have been run exclusively by Agriculture and Interior Departments;
restructuring the federal Air Traffic Control System into an independent federal corporate
entity supported by user fees; authorizing Department of Housing and Urban Development to
form limited partnerships with private real estate firms to manage and sell defaulted rental
properties; utilizing some private firms to conduct safety inspections as supplement to
inspections by Occupational Safety and Health Administration); see also AL GORE, NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REviEw, COMMON SENSE GOVERNMENT WoRKs BETTER AND COSTS LEss 7,
120, 121, 123, 127, 128, 132, 134 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 NPR REPORT] (further
recommending privatization of such diverse federal activities as Sallie Mae and Connie Lee
loan programs; NASA spacecraft communications; Commerce Department seafood
inspections; specialized National Weather Service functions; firefighter training; management
of National Institutes of Health clinical center; supply and equipment acquisitions by federal
intelligence agencies; and Labor Department penalty and debt collection services). The NPR
recommendations also include simplifying procurement regulations in order to facilitate
contracting out by federal agency managers. See 1993 NPR REPORT, supra, at 26-31, 156;
see also AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REvIEw, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT
WORKs BETTER AND CoSTS LESS, STATUS REPORT 51-54 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 NPR
REPORT]. Another measure recommended in the NPR studies was launched-amid much
controversy-by the Clinton Administration in 1996: privatizing background security checks
for many federal offices. See Richard W. Stevenson, Clinton Proceeds with Plan to Privatize
Security Checks, N.Y. TIME, July 2, 1996, at Al.
16 For example, California has leased the median on its State Highway Route 91 to a
private company that has built a new four-lane toll road in the middle of the state-run freeway.
See Marianne Lavelle, Public Works Go Private, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at Al.
Massachusetts has replaced several state hospitals with private care providers, and has hired
private firms to manage state skating rinks and zoos as well as to help enforce its automobile
lemon laws. See Peter J. Howe, Unions to Fight Push to Go Private, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
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building security, and a plethora of other governmental needs and services. 17
Proponents of these measures believe that private enterprises can deliver
particular services and create specific goods for the benefit of the citizenry
more efficiently than government workers.1 8 They also contend that having
22, 1992, at 29. New Jersey has privatized the operation of 26 motor vehicle licensing
agencies and medical care for the state's more than 20,000 inmates and has considered hiring
private vendors to run a state veterans home and perform other functions. See Bill Sanderson,
Whitnan Pitches the Benefits of Privatizing, BERGEN RECORD, Oct. 29, 1995, at 1. The state
of New York established a commission on privatization that, among other things, considered
selling off the World Trade Center and two major airports. See Elizabeth Moore, Doling out
Services: The Push for Privatization Is Strong But Will Unions, Taxpayers Stand for It?,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 15, 1996, at C1.
On a national basis, the 1996 welfare reform law is expected to result in billions of
dollars in private contracts through which state governments will outsource the administration
of their federally-funded welfare programs. See Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering
Race to Run State Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at Al.
17 A 1987 survey by the Touche-Ross firm revealed that 99% of all local governments
had contracted out some services within the past five years. See William T. Gormley, Jr., The
Privatizalion Controversy, in PRnvmZATiON AND iTs ALTERNATVS, supra note 15, at 3, 4.
An earlier survey of 1780 county and municipal governments in 1982 showed that, on
average, each surveyed jurisdiction fully or partially contracted out 27% of some 59
enumerated services, including such diverse items as vehicle towing, EMS/ambulance
services, insect/rodent control, hospital management, public works, and transportation. See
CARL F. VALNm & LYDIA D. MANCHESrER, REnHING LOCAL SERvICES: EXAMINING
ALTERNATIV DELIVERY APPROACmS, Table B, at xv (1984), summarized in E.S. Savas,
Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAmD. L. REv. 889, 890-92 (1987) [hereinafter Savas,
Privatization and Prisons]. Another study by the Mercer Group, a management consulting
firm, found that between 1987 and 1995 the number of local governments that privatized bill
collection, jail food services, ambulance, health and medical services, and street maintenance
services had doubled. See Platte, supra note 14, at Al.
A number of counties and cities in the 1990's have embarked on major privatization
initiatives. See, e.g., Platte, supra note 14, at Al (reporting that Orange County, California
plans to privatize a host of activities, including its local airport; that Chicago has privatized 35
services, including sewer maintenance, health care, and water billings; that Indianapolis has
tamed over 50 city services, including trash collection and waste water treatment, to private
suppliers; and that Philadelphia has privatized over 19 tasks, including street maintenance and
museum security); Lavelle, supra note 16, at Al (noting that flood control authority of Ohio's
Great Miami Valley has divested its waste water system for nearly $7 million, and that
Petaluma, California, Toledo, Ohio, Wilmington, Delaware, and West New York, New
Jersey are considering similar actions); Moore, supra note 16, at Cl (describing New York
City's efforts to privatize its public hospitals, housing, welfare services, jails, and a public TV
station).
18 See, e.g., CHARLE H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PRos (1990);
PRESIDENT's COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECIE
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private contractors do some of government's work can exert beneficial
competitive pressures on the public agencies that directly perform the balance
of that work. 19 Critics of the privatization trend, on the other hand, think that its
financial benefits are often illusory or exaggerated. They warn that important
values such as quality, safety, integrity, and accountability will be compromised
when public services are entrusted to profit-maximizing private actors. 20
GOVERNMENT (1988); THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN STATE SERvICE DELIVERY: EXAMPLES OF
INNOVATIVE PRACrICES (Valerie Nellin ed., 1989); PRiVATIZATION: THE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC SERVICES BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Roger L. Kemp ed., 1991); PuBLIc SERvICE
PRIVATIZATION: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SERVICE DELIVERY (Lawrence K. Finley ed.,
1989); E.S. SAvAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BErER GoVERNMENT (1987) [hereinafter
SAVAS, PRIVrIZATION]; E.S. SAVAS, THE PuBuc SECTOR: How TO SHRINK GOVERNMENT
(1982) [hereinafter SAVAS, THE PUBLIC SECTOR]; Stuart Butler, Privaization for Public
Purposes, in PRIVATIZATON AND ITs ALTERNATIVES, supra note 15, at 17; Ronald A. Cass,
Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 449 (1988); Robert M. Spann,
Public Versus Private Provision of Governmental Services, in BuDGErs AND BUREAUCRATs:
THE SOURCES OF GOvERNMENT GROWTH 71 (Thomas E. Borcherding ed., 1977); Paul R.
Verkuil, Reverse Yardstick Competition: A New Deal for the Nineties, 45 FIA. L. REV. 1
(1993).
19 This motivation factor is a main argument advanced in favor of educational vouchers,
based on the supposition that offering parents the alternative of publicly funded private schools
will induce public schools to perform better. See, e.g., Dwight R. Lee, Vouchers-The Key to
Meaningfid Reform, in PRIVATZATION AND ITS ALTEmATIVES, supra note 15, at 39, 47-49.
In a report to Congress on the private management of public school districts in four localities,
the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that, despite mixed results obtained, the private
vendors "have served as catalysts for [the] school districts' rethinidng and challenging the
status quo." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-96-3, PRIVATE
MANAGEmENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS: EARLY ExPERiENCEs IN FoUR SCHOOL DmSTIucrS 28
(1996) [hereinafter GAO/HEHS-96-3]. Although not across-the-board advocates of
privatization, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler have noted the beneficial impact of selective
privatization in stimulating ways to re-invent the delivery of governmental services. See
DAVID OSBORNE & TED GABLER, REvTING GOVERNMENT: How TnE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPmrr Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 16-24 (1992).
20 See, e.g., Ronald C. Moe, Exploring the Limits of Privatization, 47 PUB. ADmwI.
REv. 453, 457-58 (1987); Jonas Prager, Contracting-Out: Theory and Policy, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 73, 103-11 (1992); Paul Starr, The Case for Skepticism, in PRIVATnZATION
AND ITS ALTERNAnIVES, supra note 15, at 25; Harold J. Sullivan, Privatization of Public
Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights, 47 PuB. ADmIN. REV. 461, 464-66
(1987); Carl E. Van Horn, The Myths and Realities of Privatization, in PRIVATIZATION AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES, supra note 15, at 261. There are also concerns that the public may be
denied important information about contracted-out government programs. See Bill Kovach,
When Public Business Goes Private, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at A29 (describing how
certain government contractors have restricted media contacts, while others have obtained
exclusive contractual rights to disseminate public data).
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The concept of delegating governmental functions and the fulfillment of
public needs to private vendors is not, of course, a 1990's innovation.
Throughout American history, the federal government and its state and local
counterparts have frequently hired outside contractors to perform designated
tasks. 21 Government procurement, particularly with respect to national defense,
has taken on enormous dimensions. 22 Traditionally, privatization has been more
common in filling governmental needs for physical items (such as producing
military hardware, supplying office desks, and constructing roads and bridges)
as opposed to providing human services (such as teaching public schools,
counseling welfare recipients, or conducting regulatory inspections) needed by
government to carry out its public mission.23 For example, a 1987 Touche-Ross
survey of cities and counties indicated that while 59% of the local governments
surveyed had hired private contractors for solid waste collection or disposal and
43% had contracted out for buildings or grounds, only 5% of them had
contracted out for child care or day care services, and only 12% had done so
for services to the elderly or the handicapped. 24
To be sure, the extent that government is perceived to be privatizing public
functions depends on one's notions of what functions belong to the government
in the first place. As the programmatic responsibilities of American government
21 The federal judiciary recognized early on the inherent power of the United States
government, later codified in various procurement statutes, to contract with private parties in
carrying out its duties and in exercising its powers. See United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 115, 128 (1831); United States v. Maurice, 26 Cas. 1211, 1216-18 (C.C.D. Va. 1823)
(No. 15,747). See generally REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GovER ETr PROCUREMENT,
APPENDIX G: HISrORIcAL DEVELoPMENT OF THE PROCUREMENT PRocEss 163-84 (1972).
Contracting out has also been a long standing practice at the state and local levels. As one
historical illustration, Malcolm Feeley has traced the development of state-leased private
prisons in the nineteenth century in Kentucky and other southern and western states. See
Malcolm M. Feeley, The Privatization of Punishment in Historical Perspective, in
PRvATzATnoN AND ITS ALTERNAnvEs, supra note 15, at 199, 212-15.
22 In the defense arena, for instance, the Pentagon awarded $116 billion in new prime
contracts to private firms furnishing military supplies, services, or construction in the United
States for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1993. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISCALABSiRACr OFTHE UNrED STATES: 1995, Table 548, at 356 (1995).
23 See, e.g., SAvAs, PRiVATZATION, supra note 18, at 121 (distinguishing between
privatization of "physical and commercial services" versus less-common privatization of
"protective and human services"); Janet Rothenberg Pack, Privatization of Public-Sector
Services in Theory and Practice, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 524-25 (1987) (noting that
privatization has tended to concentrate in the area of "intermediate" rather than "final" goods
and services).
24 See TOUCHE-Ross, PRIVATIZATION IN AMERICA 10 (1987), excerpted in
PRiVATZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVS, supra note 15, at 9.
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have expanded in this century to meet societal needs,25 so too have the
operations of government enlarged, at least until recently, to carry out those
responsibilities. 26 Given the longstanding role that American government
undeniably plays in so many subject areas today, it is difficult to draw clear or
useful distinctions between so-called "traditional" or "core" governmental
functions and "nontraditional" or "peripheral" ones.27 There is widespread and
dynamic variation, particularly at the state and local levels, as to which public
services are provided by private firms and which ones are performed by
government employees. 28 The logic of attempted classifications is also
undermined when one considers the experiences of less market-oriented
countries where state-owned and state-operated functions are more prevalent. 29
25 Consider, for example, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, modem-day
defense, national security, and intelligence programs, federal highways, aviation regulation,
the National Labor Relations Act, the Superfund program and other environmental measures,
food and drug regulation, government-subsidized housing, nuclear regulation, narcotics law
enforcement, the space program, occupational safety and health regulation, federal antitrust
and trade regulation, securities and banking regulation, civil rights, and legal services for the
poor, just to list a few at the federal level.
26 In parallel manner tracking the growth of government's role, a host of federal
departments and agencies were created (or reorganized from prior governmental units) in the
twentieth century to carry out those new functions. For example, the following federal
agencies were launched to implement the activities corresponding to the programs listed in the
preceding footnote: the Social Security Administration, the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, the
National Labor Relations Board, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug
Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and the Legal Services Corporation. The proliferation of new agencies also has
occurred in state and local governments in recent decades.
27 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539-47 (1985)
(repudiating analysis that would attempt, for purposes of defining the scope of residual state
powers under the Tenth Amendment, to distinguish "integral" or "traditional" state
governmental functions from "nonintegral" or "nontraditional" ones); see also Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-68 (1955) (rejecting efforts to identify "uniquely"
governmental functions for purposes of ascertaining scope of governmental tort immunity).
28 See, e.g., Miranda & Andersen, supra note 14, at 28-29 (describing numerous
variations in contracting out among public entities over different time periods); Savas,
Privatization and Prisons, supra note 17, at 890-95 (same); Platte, supra note 14, at Al
(same).
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Accordingly, this Article does not attempt to inventory our own government's
pervasive activities and place them into neat cubbyholes. Rather, it examines
facets of the privatization of the governmental status quo without reviewing
how government got into that particular activity in the first place, or whether
that activity legitimately "belonged" under government's control. The analysis
thus presumes that there was some legal basis-whether it be legislation,
executive order, or constitutional mandate-that authorized government to have
responsibility for the particular functions under discussion.
Privatization itself can take on many forms, ranging from what has been
described as the "load-shedding" of an existing governmental operation (where
the means of financing and delivering a public good or service are turned over
entirely to the private sector) to the contracting out of specific public tasks or
needs (where the government relies on private vendors but still keeps ultimate
control and responsibility over the activity). 30 This Article focuses on the latter:
scenarios where government uses its contracting powers to engage one or more
private entities to perform designated tasks. Although at times such government
contracts are also formed with nonprofit organizations, the discussion below is
confined to the more typical scenario in which the "outside contractor" is a for-
profit commercial enterprise.
29 The United Kingdom, for example, has a history of much greater state ownership and
operational control of what are customarily private functions in the United States. The more
recent initiatives of the Thatcher and Major Governments to privatize government-run
functions in the United Kingdom such as telephone service and the national airline are well
known, and have been replicated elsewhere. See, e.g., Competing for Quality: Buying Better
Public Services, in HER MAr. TRFAs. REP., 1991, CmND 1730; V.V. Ramanadham,
Privatisation: The U.K. Experience and Developing Countries, in PRIVATSATION IN
DEVELOPING COuNTRms 53 (V.V. Ramanadham ed., 1989). Data gathered by the World
Bank shows that almost 7000 governmental enterprises were privatized worldwide between
1980 and 1991, predominantly in the former East Germany and other former Communist bloc
countries. See Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank
Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S23, S24, S33 (1992).
30 See Marc Bendick, Jr., Privatizing the Delivery of Social Welfare Services: An Idea to
Be Taken Seriously, in PRIvATIZATiON AND THE WELFARE STATE 97, 98-99 (Sheila B.
Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989).
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B. Contractor Accountability: Three Senses and Multiple Concerns
A key concern in contractually shifting governmental functions or needs to
the private sector is the accountability of the firms hired to perform that work.
Such accountability is vital in at least three senses. First, there is the direct
contractual accountability of the private entity to the government pursuant to the
terms and conditions of its procurement agreement.31 Second, there is the
accountability of the contractor to the citizens that directly "use" the vendor's
services or products, such as the commuters who ride privately-run public
buses, the inmates who are housed in privatized jails, or the homeowners
whose curbside waste is collected by municipally contracted carting firms.
Third, there is the ultimate political accountability of the contractor and the
government itself to the public at large, in discharging a public function
effectively and at a fair cost to the taxpayers. Under this last meaning of the
term "accountability," it does not matter that many citizens do not directly use
the privatized service in the same way as the hypothetical commuter, inmate, or
homeowner in the second category. The private vendor nevertheless must be
accountable to all members of the community that are indirectly benefited or
harmed, tangibly or intangibly, 32 by the provision of the service. In using the
31 Ile accountability of the private vendor may also influence the accountability of the
governmental agency that hires it or that, in some manner, competes with it. In this vein, the
private vendor hired to run the Minneapolis School District observed, in a published letter
commenting on the GAO's study of that privatized district, that "the really interesting
question is not public vs. private management, but what strategies are best pursued in public
education today such that these systems can and will be accountable for achieving their
purpose." Letter from Laurie Ohrmann, Vice President, Public Strategies Group, Inc. to
Cornelia M. Blanchette, Associate Director, Education and Employment Issues,
GAO/HEHS-96-3, supra note 19, at 74 (emphasis added). Ms. Ohrmann further asserted to
the GAO that her firm's "willingness to hold [it] accountable for the results it produces for
the district is a key to building the same accountability throughout the rest of the system, with
teachers in their classrooms, with principals in their schools and with parents and community
members outside the school day." Id. (emphasis added).
32 There are often indirect benefits that persons derive from the effective delivery of a
governmental service, whether that service is provided by government itself or by a
government contractor. For example, a motorist driving her car may indirectly benefit from
less-congested streets as the result of others riding privatized city buses; a would-be crime
victim may indirectly benefit from a private firm's secure management of a state prison; and a
landowner may indirectly benefit from the health and environmental hazards avoided through
timely and effective privatized trash collection at her neighbor's house. There also can be
significant moral benefits in citizens simply knowing that vital public services, such as
programs for children, the poor, and the elderly, are being capably provided by a private
vendor, even though many citizens may never personally avail themselves of such services.
Likewise, there are indirect harms inflicted on people when a government service is provided
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term "accountability" in this Article, I include all three of these important
meanings.
Accountability derives from the very underpinnings of a representative
democracy. 33 The citizens have consensually entrusted the government to carry
out certain tasks for their overall benefit. If the government fails to discharge
those assignments capably, the citizens have the opportunity to show their
displeasure through the ballot box by electing new public officials in the
executive and legislative branches to replace their failed predecessors. 34
However, when we privatize governmental functions through contracting out,
the control of public functions alarmingly may become too removed from such
democratic oversight.35 Private companies are not chosen by voters to
undertake public functions. They are hired, not elected. Such firms'
responsibilities to the public they serve thus are not measured by popular will.
Rather, they are regulated by the specifications in their respective procurement
contracts, and otherwise by the general rule of law. In carrying out those
responsibilities in lieu of the state itself, private contractors must be
accountable, or the public will be shortchanged.
ineffectively. These harms may include such things as the physical harm to persons and
property run over by a privatized city bus, environmental harms from leaky garbage
dumpsters used by municipally contracted trash collectors, or economic harms caused by the
unfair conduct of a business hired to manage specified public works.
33 James Q. Wilson has listed accountability as one of the key concerns of government,
along with equity, fiscal integrity, and efficiency. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BuREAucRACY:
WHAT GovERNMENT AGEN IES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 316 (1989). Accountability can
help advance those other objectives, or perhaps stated more obviously in the negative, a lack
of accountability over governmental services can breed inequity, corruption, and inefficiency.
34 Undoubtedly, the electoral process itself can be ineffective in promoting the
accountability of public officials. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. Nevertheless,
when public officials contract out their work to private companies, the potential corrective
influence of the electoral process is even further lessened.
35 As Osborne and Gaebler have observed, accountability is also crucial even where
government chooses not to go so far as to privatize its functions but simply decentralizes them
out to smaller units of government or down to lower-tier civil servants. In such scenarios, it is
important that the public agencies that are delegating their powers "articulate their missions,
create internal cultures around their core values, and measure results." OsBORNE & GAEBLER,
supra note 19, at 254. According to Osborne and Gaebler, replacing authoritarian
governmental cultures bound by strict internal bureaucratic rules with "loose-tight" cultures
that allow more flexibility in attaining clearly-defined public objectives will help assure that
"[a]ccountability for inputs gives way to accountability for outcomes." Id.; see also THoMAs
PEERs & ROBERT WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S
BEsr-RuN COMPANIs 15-16, 318-25 (1982) (praising loose-tight management techniques
that simultaneously encourage innovation and autonomy by lower-echelon workers while
maintaining adequate centralized controls over organization's direction).
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As Carl Van Horn has observed, "Fears about the lack of accountability for
service delivery [are] a principal impediment to new privatization ventures." 36
These accountability concerns are particularly acute in contracting out
governmental social services, a realm in which outcomes are more difficult to
measure than for physical services and where the risks of failure may be more
serious. 37 The privatization of linen supplies for a public veterans hospital, for
example, may be more readily evaluated by contract standards that detail such
things as the quantities and dimensions of bed sheets than, say, the privatization
of the physical therapy services rendered to the patients in that facility.
Those public services that are generally perceived, at least, to entail core
governmental functions38 tend to raise more pronounced accountability
concerns when they are privatized. 39 So do governmental services that call for a
degree of discretionary judgment by the service provider, which at times can
involve policy-laden assessments.4n Through privatization, decisions are placed
36 Van Horn, supra note 20, at 261,277.
37 See William T. Gormley, Jr., Two Cheers for Privatization, in PPJVATIZATION AND
ITs ALTERNATIVES, supra note 15, at 307, 311.
38 See id. As mentioned above, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, the far-flung
extent of governmental functions today is not that easily or logically split into one pile of
core/traditional activities and another of peripheral/nontraditional ones. Whether, for
example, curbside refuse collection is regarded as a traditionally private or public function in
a given jurisdiction depends in large part on local custom and history. Putting such harder
classification problems aside, however, one must recognize that there are some governmental
services in our country (e.g., elementary education, police, prisons, libraries, seweage) that
have been more frequently, if not universally or continuously, provided directly by public
employees. When those particular services that are more often thought to be at the core of
government get privatized, we tend to become more worried about such change and about
having appropriate mechanisms of accountability in place.
39The effort by the Clinton Administration to privatize about 40% of the work of
conducting security investigations of federal officeholders, for instance, met with major
objections voiced by persons distrustful of delegating such a traditional governmental function
to outside firms. It is feared that such private contractors will be more apt to misuse,
misinterpret, or leak such sensitive private information than would federal agents in the career
service. Those accountability concerns are accentuated by the problems uncovered in the
White House's mishandling of FBI security files of high-level personnel from an outgoing
Administration. See Stevenson, supra note 15, at All ("I truly believe that the type of work
we do is inherently governmental.... There should be strict controls and strict access. It's
not something that should have the profit motive behind it.") (quoting a federal investigator
currently doing background checks); see also Stephen Gillers, 'Filegate' Was Bad Enough.
Now This?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5, 1996, at A23 (decrying privatization of federal security
checks as an improper delegation of an inherently governmental function).
40 For example, the principal of a public school may need to consider taking immediate
disciplinary action to remove a teacher or student who appears to be posing a threat within the
school building. That sort of on-the-spot judgment can implicate the principal's policy
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in the hands of the private contractor with the delegated responsibility to make
such "calls" unless the contract terms or rules of law prescribe a course of
action. Delegating such authority over public functions to private actors can
make folks nervous-at least in contexts where we have been previously
accustomed to reposing day-to-day responsibility (and pinning blame when
things go awry) on public officials. 41 We are used to complaining to the Mayor,
preferences about issues such as discipline, safety, procedural fairness, and the like-which
may or may not coincide with the policy preferences of the governing body or the community
at large. When that principal is not a public employee, but rather works for a private
contractor hired to manage the school, the linkage between the public's own policy
preferences and those of the decisionmaker is more attenuated. Similar concerns arise in the
management of other public institutions such as hospitals, jails, nursing homes, day care
centers, and police forces, which likewise at times require the immediate exercise of
discretion. In making this observation, I do not contend that public employees are necessarily
responsive or attentive to public preferences, for many facets of government bureaucracies
often skew and stymie the performance of public officials. See infra notes 53, 115 and
accompanying text. The point here is simply that the democratic process is even less apt to
influence the behavior of private workers hired through government contracts to fill those civil
servants' shoes.
41 Fueled by such concerns, a good deal has been written raising questions about the
accountability of private firms to manage prisons, institutions which often are regarded as
core governmental operations and ones that demand considerable on-the-spot discretion by the
warden and her subordinates. See, e.g., LOGAN, supra note 18 (detailing the many arguments
that have been raised against privatizing prisons, but advocating that contracting out of prison
operations should still be more frequently pursued); Nicole B. Casarez, Furthering the
Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private
Prison Records, 28 Mic. J. oF LAW REF. 249 (1995) (urging federal legislation to assure
that records of privately-rn federal prisons are publicly accessible as a means of promoting
prison contractors' accountability); Warren I. Cikins, Privatization of the American Prison
System: An Idea Whose Thme Has Come?, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. Enmcs & Pum. PoL'Y 445
(1986) (advocating careful monitoring to deter corruption in private prisons); Michael
Keating, Jr., Public over Private: Monitoring the Performance of Privately Operated Prisons
and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PuBuc INTEREsr 130 (Douglas C. McDonald ed.,
1990); Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REv.
531, 539, 796 (1989) (observing at outset of article reporting on comprehensive ABA study of
private prisons that "if this critical governmental function [(incarceration)] is to be contracted
out, it must be accomplished with total accountability," and reiterating in conclusion that "to
have any chance of succeeding in the long run, it [(prison privatization)] must be
accomplished with total accountability"); Douglas W. Dunham, Note, Inmates' Rights and
the Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1475 (1986) (arguing that thorough
safeguards are needed to assure that government has effective control over private prison
managers to assure adherence to constitutional principles); James T. Gentry, Note, The
Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 353 (1986)
(proposing fines and other measures to enhance monitoring of privately managed prisons). But
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the Governor, and even to the President when their underlings botch a public
service; if those political leaders do not fix the problem to our collective
satisfaction we can pillory them in the press and work to deny their re-election
or quash their other political aspirations. Our political reflexes are much less
developed in responding to foul-ups by private contractors hired to carry out
work of the people.42 In large measure, we tend instead to depend on
government agencies to serve as our monitors over such contractors.
C. Shortcomings of Governmental Oversight
There are many reasons, however, to be wary of relying exclusively on
government to oversee the private enterprises that it engages to perform public
tasks. The procurement process itself is open to favoritism and corruption in the
awarding of public contracts, which will occur at times in spite of stringently
worded criminal statutes and regulations that prohibit such malconduct.
Favoritism and corruption can also extend to the contract administration phase
as well, when public officials responsible for overseeing the private vendor's
work are bribed or otherwise persuaded to overlook the vendor's performance
deficiencies.
Effective monitoring of contractors may be thwarted for more benign
reasons. The government agency might not be appropriated sufficient funds by
the legislative branch for auditors, inspectors, and investigators to police the
agency's outside vendors. 43 Alternatively, the technical aspects of contract
see Savas, Privatization and Prisons, supra note 17, at 899 (praising "expected innovations
from a private prison industry and the introduction of competition as an antidote to
government monopoly").
42 This is not to suggest that private firms are indifferent to adverse publicity or angry
citizens, or that the public lacks any means to exert control over such firms. The point here is
simply that the conventional instruments of majoritarian control through the political process
(e.g., partisan campaigns, public petitions, referenda, political action committees, letters to
the editor, pickets, leaflets and rallies, and so on) are better suited to influencing politicians
than they are to influencing business enterprises. Private firms are more attuned to economic
measures that directly affect their bottom lines than they are to political measures that only
can affect them indirectly. For example, the managers of a private firm may not worry much
about picketing outside of corporate headquarters that has no real effect on the firm's ability to
do business, but should be quite concerned about organized consumer boycotts that lower the
demand for its goods or services.
43 This can be a substantial problem in the current political climate in which
governmental downsizing is especially popular. In fact, a public agency stripped of adequate
qualified staff may even need to resort to privatizing some or all of its own contract
monitoring efforts, by hiring outside accountants, auditors, attorneys, and other private
specialists with the expertise to review its other private contractors. Professor Prager, an
economist, has concluded that the few studies that have examined government contract
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administration may become so specialized that government will lack qualified
in-house personnel to determine if a contractor is properly performing its job.
Private contractors are apt to capitalize on these monitoring weaknesses by
cutting comers in their assigned projects, using subpar materials, or skimping
on labor. Moreover, when contract awards are contested by disappointed
bidders, government often incurs litigation costs and other administrative
burdens. Such disputes can siphon away public resources that could have been
devoted to, among other things, the effective implementation and oversight of
the contractors' work. The public, meanwhile, is disadvantaged, especially in
situations where the outsourced function is suspended, scaled back, or
otherwise restrained during the time that the procurement is tied up in court.44
Accountability also can suffer if the government becomes too dependent on
a limited stable of private contractors. If the government has contracted with a
single-source private entity to displace an entire public agency need or
operation, that entity will have a monopoly for the government's business.45
Such monopolies will cause the taxpayers to pay higher prices for that entity's
ongoing services once government loses the functional capacity to retrieve those
functions in house or to bid them out to a different contractor willing to make
the necessary start-up investments to perform them. The private vendor itself,
having an economic stake in continuing its business relationship with the public
agency, may effectively lobby the legislative and executive branches to resist
beneficial changes in government programs that might eliminate or reduce the
need for that vendor's services.
Privatization also can hinder accountability where it reduces the
noneconomic stake held by the persons actually responsible for providing the
services to the public. This can arise in situations where privatization results in
monitoring costs have been uninformative and have tended to underestimate such costs. See
Prager, supra note 20, at 98-100. He further observes that some governmental agencies,
particularly at the local level, merely oversee the financial terms of procurement contracts and
do not monitor the actual product or service supplied by the vendors to assure compliance.
See id. at 99-100 n.71.
44 At times such bid disputes might produce offsetting benefits to the public if, for
example, the litigation reveals that it was not in the public's best interests to have the contract
awarded to the putative successful bidder. However, such litigation often tends to be more of
a costly intramural fight between private competitors over obtaining a lucrative government
contract than a process for optimizing public welfare.
45 Defense contracting offers a classic example of such monopolistic tendencies, due to
the economies of scale and organizational learning curves associated with producing
specialized equipment for the military. See Marina Lao, Mergers in a Declining Defense
Industry: Should the Merger Guidelines Be Reassessed?, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 347, 385-89
(1996) (arguing that antitrust guidelines for mergers of defense firms should be revised to take
into account these tendencies toward natural monopoly in military procurement).
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the large-scale replacement of state or local government employees-many of
whom will typically reside in or near communities they have served in their
public jobs-with private workers that may come from disparate places. 46 Such
newcomers may not share, at least immediately, the same concerns of
longstanding residents about the particular public service that they are
providing. If the work involved is portable (e.g., "back-office" communications
or data processing functions), the private vendor may have much of it
physically done elsewhere by nonlocal workers. Managerial control might be
wielded at a private vendor's out-of-state headquarters by executives having no
special concern for the welfare of the community that hired their company.
Moreover, out-of-state private bidders that have been awarded contracts on a
transitory basis simply may not be attuned to local regulatory, legal, political,
environmental, social, or cultural conditions that can affect the performance of
their contractual duties.47
There are also constitutional limitations on the government's power over its
contractors. Legislation or other government action that strips the private
vendor of a bargained-for entitlement may run afoul of the Contract Clause of
the United States Consitution.48 Additionally, a contractor might contend that
adverse governmental action has resulted in an unconstitutional taking of its
property without just compensation or due process of law.49 If the contractor
46 Not surprisingly, public employee unions have exerted pressure to stop privatization
measures altogether, and failing that, to make the government contractually obligate the new
private vendor to interview and rehire a number of the public employees that would otherwise
be displaced by the privatized contract. See Howe, supra note 16, at 29; Moore, supra note
16, at Cl. The retention of such local workers obviously tempers the intangible disadvantages
of contracting out to a company with no previous ties to the community.
47 Countervailing these disadvantages, of course, is the potential expertise gained by
utilizing outside contractors selected from a wider market of service providers. At times,
those outsiders will not be hemmed in by the same bureaucratic limitations and parochial
conventions that can encumber local civil servants, and they may bring skills and resources
not available locally. As the old saying goes, an "expert" might be defined simply as
"somebody from out of town." See, e.g., Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985);
Mark Kadzielski et al., Peer Review and Practice Guidelines Under Health Care Refonn, 16
WHMrrr L. REV. 157, 167 (1995); Proceedings of the International Symposium on Law and
Science at the Crossroads: Biomedical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the Law:
Defining the Linits of Organ and Yissue Research and Transplantation, 27 SuFFoLK U. L.
REv. 1457, 1457 (1993).
48 See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10; see, e.g., United States Trust Co. of New York v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (rendering void under the Contract Clause the retroactive repeal of
a statutory covenant upon which private enterprise relied when contracting with state).
49 See U.S. CoNsr. amends. V, XIV; see also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571
(1934) (invalidating under Due Process Clause repudiation by Congress of the terms of
certain insurance contracts issued by United States during World War I); Bowen v. Public
[Vol. 58:175
PR1VATZATIONAND PUNITIVES
has a long-term agreement that precludes the government from terminating the
contract for its own convenience, such constitutional precepts may insulate the
contractor from the prevailing winds of political change. Unless some breach of
contract or out-and-out illegal conduct can be established, the public may well
be stuck with a "bad deal" that government has made with a private vendor
until that contract is completed or comes up for renewal or rebidding.50
It is not this Article's objective to settle the raging debate over the virtues or
evils of privatization. That debate will go on, and should go on, as we continue
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986) (acknowledging
that congressional actions that breach outstanding federal contracts can amount to
compensable takings under the Fifth Amendment, but finding no contractual duties had been
created in the facts presented). During this past Term, the Supreme Court underscored, in
United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), the limits of Government in its role
as a contracting party. In Winstar, the Court held that the Government did not have the
unfettered sovereign power to rescind contractual promises it had made to investors who had
purchased failing savings and loan institutions in the 1980s. Specifically, the Court found that
the Government could not, through the passage of statutes changing the capital reserve
requirements for thrift institutions, deprive thrift purchasers of beneficial accounting treatment
that the Government earlier had promised them at the time of the thrift acquisitions. See id. at
2442-46. A majority of the Justices in Winstar were unpersuaded by the Government's
arguments that subsequent regulatory changes were insulated from liability under traditional
legal doctrines protecting the Government's "sovereign acts" and requiring "unmistakability"
in contract language claimed to waive the sovereign's power to enact future legislation. The
Court rejected those defenses in spite of the general welfare that would have been advanced,
in the context of the national savings and loan crisis, by the subsequent legislation. See id. at
2461,2463-71.
50 Harold Krent has highlighted the antimajoritarian dangers of allowing legislators and
executives to enter into long-term government contracts that bargain away the sovereignty and
policy choices of future administrations. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign
Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1529, 1560-64 (1992). The Supreme Court's narrowing of the
sovereign acts and unmistakability doctrines in Wmstar, described supra note 49, will make it
more difficult for Government to extract itself from such agreements. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Ginsburg in dissent in Winstar, expressed fears that the
plurality's opinion "works sweeping changes in... the law dealing with Government
contracts" in a manner that overlooks "the necessity of protecting the federal fisc-and the
taxpayers who foot the bills-from possible improvidence on the part of the countless
Government officials who must be authorized to enter into contracts for the Government."
Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2479, 2485 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Whether or not Winstar was
correctly decided, its effect will be to reduce the control that government can properly exert
over its contractors. As argued herein, private litigation can play a useful role in filling in the
gaps of governmental oversight.
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to experience5' or retreat from52 privatization in actual practice. But whether
one favors or disfavors such contracting out in principle, few would quarrel53
with the notion that accountability is a sine qua non to the successful
privatization of any public function in practice. As explained above, that
essential feature includes accountability to the public agency that engages the
outside firm, to the citizens that use or rely on that privatized service, and in an
ultimate sense, to the electorate at large.
For reasons explored more fully below, rules of law can provide an
important tool in promoting the accountability of government contractors. As a
threshold to such analysis, it is first useful to delve into the liability precepts that
apply to the government itself when it causes injuries to others. A cornerstone
of those principles is the historic doctrine of sovereign immunity, a doctrine that
in spite of its criticisms has proven to be remarkably durable and one that has
even been legislatively and judicially extended at times in the modem era to
cover certain activities by government contractors.
51 See the privatization trends and developments described supra notes 14-30 and
accompanying text.52 In the past year, for example, both Baltimore, Maryland, and Hartford, Connecticut
prematurely ended their respective five-year contracts with a private firm to manage some or
all of their city schools after budgetary and contract performance issues arose that made
completion of the contracts undesirable. See GAO/IHEHS-96-3, supra note 19, at 3; see also
Elissa Silverman, Learning Curve, THE NEw RE'uBuc, Jan. 29, 1996, at 10-11. But see
Peter Applebome, Grading For-Profit Schools: So Far, So Good, N.Y. TMEs, June 26,
1996, at Al (reporting successes of privatized public schools operated in Boston,
Massachusetts, Wichita, Kansas, Mount Clemens, Michigan, and Sherman, Texas by a
different contractor from the one utilized in Baltimore and Hartford).
5 3 It has been argued that the accountability to the voting public of government agencies
is not all that important. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 123, 177-79 (1994) (contending that the absence of direct
electoral accountability of independent federal administrative agencies is "comparatively
irrelevant" to the offsetting advantages of insulating such agencies from hegemonic control by
the President or Congress). Nevertheless, Greene acknowledges that even nominally
"independent" agencies are not "truly free-floating." Id. at 179. Such agencies still are
accountable to the President because of his role in the appointment and reappointment of
agency heads, the agencies' reliance upon the White House and the Office of Management
and Budget for support in budgetary negotiations with Congress, and their dependence on the
Department of Justice in legal matters. Likewise, such agencies are also dependent upon
Congress with regard to their annual budgets as well as for maintaining their delegated
statutory authority. See id. Greene's above-cited article also does not reach the question posed
herein, i.e., the accountability ofprivate contractors hired by administrative agencies.
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H. IMMuNrTY AND LIABILIY CONCEPTS AS APPLIED TO GOVERNMENT
AND TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
Countless persons who either have sued or considered suing the
government over an injury resulting from a public function have confronted the
axiom that "the king can do no wrong." 54 The principle of sovereign immunity,
a vestige of the English common law, has remained largely embedded in
American jurisprudence55 despite modem statutes and case law that have
reduced its contours. 56 While the federal government57  and many
54The doctrine does not signify that a King is incapable of wrongdoing, but rather that a
King would not have wanted a wrong to be committed in his name. See WIlim
BiAcKSrONE, COMMENTARIES ON TBE LAWs OF ENGLAND 78 (William Browne, ed., 1897)
("The King can do nothing wrong. This means, that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct
of public affairs, is not to be imputed to the King, nor is he answerable for it personally to the
people."); see also &x Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) (holding that a federal court
may enjoin a state official, if not state government, from engaging in federal constitutional
violations, under the legal fiction that the wrongdoing state official is not carrying out the will
of the sovereign state).
55 In 1821, the United States Supreme Court first held, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, that the United States could not be sued without its consent. See Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). Later opinions reaffirmed the
government's immunity. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882)
(characterizing federal sovereign immunity as "an established doctrine"); Hill v. United
States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 385 (1850) (sustaining immunity defense); United States v.
McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846) (sustaining immunity); see also TBE FEDERAliST
No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (asserting that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent"). For a detailed tracing of the
origins of sovereign immunity principles in American law, see Rodolphe J.A. de Seite, The
KIng Is Dead, Long Live the King! The Court-Created American Concept of Immunity: The
Negation of Equality and Accountability Under Law, 24 HOFsrA L. REv. 981, 989-1020
(1996).
56 See generally W. PAGE KEnTON Er AL., PROssER AND KEErON, ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 131-32 (5th ed. 1984).
57 Pursuant to the Tucker Act, first passed by Congress in 1887, nontort monetary
claims may be brought against the United States in what is now the Court of Federal Claims.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491(a)(1) (1994). Since the passage in 1946 of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, Congress has also waived much of the federal government's sovereign immunity
from tort liability, allowing tort actions (subject to various exceptions and limitations) to be
brought against the United States in the federal district courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
1402, 2401-02, 2412, 2671-80 (1994). A 1976 Act of Congress also waived, again subject to
certain restrictions, the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in the federal
district courts seeking injunctive or other nonmonetary relief. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
Government contractors specifically can bring actions against the United States in the Court of
Federal Claims pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2)
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states58 have repealed or waived the sovereign's historical immunity from suit
in a variety of contexts, the doctrine persists today through a host of codified or
judge-made exceptions that continue to immunize certain defined categories of
governmental action or inaction from civil redress. 59 In addition to having those
liability protections, public entities are often shielded from various remedial
measures normally available in purely private litigation, such as prejudgment
interest, 60 certain kinds of injunctions (e.g., those that would usurp legislative
appropriation processes unconstitutionally or would otherwise infringe too far
(1994). There are also other miscellaneous federal laws waiving portions of the United States'
sovereign immunity. See generally STEADMAN Er AL., LmGATION wrrH TE FEDERAl
GOvERNMENT (3d ed. 1994) (discussing various federal laws waiving the sovereign
immunity); 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERL PRAcrICE AND PRoCEDURE 3656
(1985 & Supp. 1995) (same).
58 See KEEToN Er AL., supra note 56, § 131, at 1045 (noting that about thirty states have
abrogated sovereign immunity in a "substantial or general way," and that all but one or two
of the rest have altered their laws to authorize civil recoveries against the state in court or
administrative proceedings).
59 For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FrCA) contains major exceptions that
immunize the government from tort liability for conduct involving discretionary functions, see
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994); the execution with due care of federal statutes or regulations that
are later found invalid, see id.; and various intentional torts including assaults, batteries, false
arrests, false imprisonments, malicious prosecutions, abuses of process, deceit, libel, slander,
or interference with contract rights, see id. § 2680(h). The Supreme Court has also construed
the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity inapplicable to injuries by military personnel
arising out of their service-related activities, thereby shielding the United States from such
suits under what is known as the "Feres doctrine." See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
146 (1950); see also infra note 66 and accompanying text. State and local governments also
are widely protected by a host of diverse statutory and common law immunities, ranging from
such things as immunity for the plan and design of public highways, see, e.g., Weiss v. Fote,
167 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 1960), to immunity for harm caused by escaped prisoners, see, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b) (West 1992), to immunity from injuries on unimproved public
lands, see CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 831.2, 831.4, 831.6 (West 1995).
6 0 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994) (disallowing interest on judgments entered against
United States in the Court of Federal Claims); id. § 2674 (barring prejudgment interest in
actions under FTCA).
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upon principles of comity or separation of powers), 61 and, as detailed in Part III
below, 62 punitive or exemplary damages.
A. Substantive and Fiscal Rationales for Immunity
The public policies underlying these enduring governmental immunities
under federal and state law can be divided into two categories. First, there are
what may be called "substantive" reasons for the governmental immunity or
limitation on liability. These substantive reasons involve a policy determination
that certain forms of governmental conduct-whether they be active or
passive-should be placed beyond the reach of civil suits because the public will
benefit if such conduct cannot be second guessed in a courtroom. Precedents
that confer, for instance, absolute immunity upon the judiciary63 for harms
arising out of in-court proceedings, or laws that provide discretionary immunity
for high level executive branch policy choices, 64 have substantive rationales
stemming from the inherent nature of those governmental activities. As a
substantive matter, the administration of justice likely would suffer if
disgruntled litigants (or other persons unhappy with case outcomes or the
language of judicial opinions) could readily vent their displeasure through
subsequent damage actions against the judiciary or court personnel. Likewise, it
arguably would be dysfunctional if the government were liable in tort every
time elected leaders or their designees, in exercising their policy prerogatives in
a good faith manner to achieve benefits for the public at large, caused some
harm to narrow private interests. Indeed, political decisions often necessarily
involve distributional impacts and societal tradeoffs that easily could instigate
lawsuits by the "losers" in those allocations. Accordingly, the law has
61 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (vacating, as contrary to federal-
state comity principles, federal district court order requiring a school district to increase realty
taxes to fund school desegregation plan); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding
states immune under Eleventh Amendment from federal injunctions to compel payment of
state funds); Camden v. Byrne, 411 A.2d 462 (N.J. 1980) (holding that judiciary ordinarily
may not compel the Legislature to make specific appropriation nor order the Governor to
recommend or approve such appropriation).62 See infra notes 89-135 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (sustaining doctrine of judicial
immunity even where bad faith alleged). See generally J. Randolph Block, Stump v.
Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879 (1980) (discussing the
history and present state of the doctrine of judicial immunity).
64 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994) (providing immunity for discretionary decisions
by federal officials); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (recognizing qualified
immunity of certain state officers for good faith infringement of other's constitutional rights).
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fashioned these and other substantive65 immunities to avoid unduly chilling
judges, presidents, governors, agency heads, and other governmental actors.
Absent protection from civil liability, governmental leaders might be more
inclined to shy away from performing their duties, at least in circumstances
where their decisions are bound to disadvantage or dissatisfy some segment of
the populace.
To some extent, what is described here as the substantive rationale of
sovereign immunity also advances constitutional norms of separation of powers.
Preserving immunity means that a range of executive and legislative decisions
may not be routinely challenged in the judicial branch through private suits
seeking monetary damages. This does not amount, however, to the airtight
insulation of executive or legislative decisionmaking. The performance of those
branches of government may still be subject to judicial review in other ways,
such as through appeals of administrative agency determinations, or through
lawsuits that attack the constitutional validity of statutes, regulations, or other
forms of state action. Nonetheless, a legal system with those alternative routes
of review is surely not as intrusive on executive and legislative prerogatives as a
system that would also allow every perceived wrong committed by the
executive or the legislature to be fodder for a common law tort action.
Perhaps recognizing their institutional self-interest in maintaining a degree
of freedom from court review, legislatures and governors have chosen to
reinstate by statute numerous facets of sovereign immunity even in those states
where the doctrine has been formally abrogated. In reviving those specific
immunities, lawmakers are often advancing substantive policies about the
651 would also sweep in this notion of substantive immunities the nonfiscal aspects of the
special procedures that typically apply to suits against public entities, e.g., presuit notice
requirements for governmental tort claims or doctrines requiring plaintiffs suing the
government to exhaust administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994) (requiring
claimants to provide written notice to the allegedly responsible agency within two years of the
accrual of the claim and barring suit for six months thereafter); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-8
(West 1992) (requiring 90 days notice to the public entity). Although such measures do
regulate procedure, they are founded upon substantive justifications tied to public policy
objectives. In particular, presuit tort notice requirements afford public entities charged with
tortious conduct greater time to investigate and to attempt to resolve such claims informally
before they are burdened by the rigors of litigation. Likewise, principles of administrative
exhaustion at times channel disputes from courts to regulatory agencies for the substantive
purpose of taking advantage of the agencies' presumed expertise over the technical subject
matter involved. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51
(1938) (requiring exhaustion of administrative agency remedies). These prerequisites also
have fiscal ramifications, in discouraging or delaying suits that could result in large financial
exposures for the government. Nevertheless, the dollar impacts of such rules may be
separated from their distinct substantive features.
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structure and operation of government itself. These substantive aims may be
distinguished from purely budgetary concerns about governmental liability that
are described below.
A second objective of sovereign immunity arises out of what can be
regarded as "fiscal" concerns. Immunities may be substantially predicated on
protecting the public treasury, and thereby the taxpayers at large, from what
could be enormous monetary liabilities if government were held legally
accountable in civil litigation in exactly the same fashion as private entities and
persons. For example, there are immunities that insulate government from tort
liability to soldiers killed or wounded in combat,66 as well as state-law tort
immunities that can protect government from failing to provide adequate police
protection or enough signs at traffic intersections. 67 These fiscal protections
grow out of the stark reality that government, in spite of its pervasiveness in our
society, simply cannot do or afford to do everything that it should do.
Assuming that the government could muster the resources to pay huge civil
judgments produced under ordinary rules of civil liability, such enormous
liabilities could skew the overall use of taxpayer dollars by diverting funds from
other programs or services that the citizens would regard as more vital. To
avoid fiscal calamity, a body of law remains to protect government treasuries
from colossal tort or other civil liabilities, even if one might think that there is
no compelling substantive reason justifying that insulation. 68
For these assorted substantive and fiscal reasons, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity lingers today, here and there in case law and statutes. 69 Accordingly,
66 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142-43 (1950); see also supra note 59. The
Feres doctrine also is founded on substantive policies to maintain the integrity of military
structure. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42. Even if one regards that substantive rationale of
Feres as unpersuasive, there can be little doubt that the potential fiscal impact of tort actions
by wounded soldiers or their estates against the United States could be enormous, especially
in times of war or other military conflicts.
67 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-5 (West 1992) (immunizing failure to provide
sufficient ordinary traffic signs); Massengill v. Yuma County, 456 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1969)immunizing from private suits the government's failure to provide adequate police
protection).
68 Of course, there are many governmental immunities that are conceptually supported
by both substantive and fiscal rationales. Absolute immunity for the judiciary, for example,
might be defended as a fiscal matter as well as a substantive matter, given the thousands of
cases disposed of by the courts daily and the fact that virtually every court decision involves at
least one unhappy loser.
69 Even where a statute is passed that seems to specify standards for governmental
behavior, the Supreme Court has required that a waiver of the government's sovereign
immunity from liability when it runs afoul of those standards be "clearly" expressed in the
statute. See Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2100 (1996) (concluding that Congress did not
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public entities are often not treated like private defendants when they are sued
in tort, for breaches of contract, or upon other legal theories of recovery. A
patchwork of immunities covers much of government at all levels, making it
hard to sue and even harder to beat in court. This at times surely leads to
inequitable outcomes in individual cases. The tradeoff is that government
agencies can go on with the public's work most of the time without undue
judicial interference or without being hampered by fears of whopping civil
exposures. 70 Those government agencies still must be ultimately accountable
for their performance, even in those situations where they are immune from
civil liability, through the democratic process.
Undoubtedly, electoral oversight is a rather crude instrument. Its
effectiveness is reduced by the flaws of the modem political campaign process
in accurately reflecting popular sentiment, as well as by the degree of autonomy
that may be statutorily delegated to any particular governmental agency. Yet, in
clearly waive federal government's sovereign immunity against monetary damages in actions
brought against United States under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); see also United States v.
Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 37 (1992) (holding that United States did not clearly
waive its sovereign immunity from monetary damages under section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code). This rule of statutory interpretation, which has the effect of preserving sovereign
immunity in instances of legislative ambiguity or silence, has been criticized as contrary to the
principle of legislative supremacy. See John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign hImunity in
an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 771, 776 (arguing that clear-statement
approach should give way to conventional rules of statutory construction in deciding whether
Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity in a particular statute).
70 Many scholars in recent years have criticized sovereign immunity as, among other
things, antidemocratic and anachronistic. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-81 (1987) (arguing that sovereign immunity should not
be a defense to constitutional violations by governmental actors); see also Roger C.
Crampton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory
Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH
L. REv. 387, 419 (1970) (observing that no scholar "has had a good word for sovereign
immunity for many years"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1093 (1989) (characterizing sovereign immunity as
an obsolescent doctrine that should be "rethought for this era when the government is our
nation's leading contractor and tortfeasor and property owner"). But see Krent, supra note 50,
at 1529-31 (defending sovereign immunity as means to promote constitutional separation of
powers because it abates pressures on Congress and the President to conform to judicial
policy values). My intention here is neither to praise sovereign immunity in general nor to
bury it. For context, I simply am recounting the premises that lie beneath our current system
of limited governmental liability. Given that extant system and its premises, this Article
simply aims to show that one facet of it-the sovereign's traditional immunity from punitive
damages liability-should not be broadened to cover government contractors. Surely even the
severest critics of sovereign immunity would concur with such an argument against extending
the doctrine any further.
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the long run, each agency must depend on the fiscal and political support of the
public at large for its survival. Without such continuing support, the agency can
be defunded or even legislated out of existence. The upshot is that public
entities may be somewhat freed from civil liability in the courthouse, but they
remain tethered to popular will in every voting booth. Although that electoral
"leash" may not be as tight as it should be, it remains a defining characteristic
of our representative democracy.
B. Extensions of Governmental Immunities to Contractors
What becomes of these various principles of sovereign immunity when the
government has contracted out some of its functions to private entities? General
sovereign immunity statutes typically confine their protections to public entities
and exclude private contractors from their literal scope.71 Moreover, quasi-
71 The FTCA specifically excludes private contractors with the United States from the
scope of its coverage. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1994). In addition, more than half of the states
have tort claim statutes that expressly carve out independent contractors from the definition of
public employees protected by the statutory immunities. See AmIz. REv. STAT. § 12-820(1)
(1992) (excluding independent contractors from the definition of immunized public
employees); CAL. GoV'T CODE § 810.2 (1995) (same); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-103(4)(a)
(West Supp. 1996) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-22(7) (1989) (same); HAw. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 662-1 (Michie 1995) (same); IDAHO CODE § 6-902(4) (1990 & Supp. 1996) (same);
745 ILL. COMp. STAT. 10/1-202 (West 1993) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-2(b)(1)
(1986 & Supp. 1996) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 669.2(4) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-6102(d) (1989 & Supp. 1995) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.200(2) (1994)
(same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.01(6) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (same); MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 2-9-101(2) (1995) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-8,210(1)-(3) (1994) (same); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:1-3 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (same); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 17(1)(a)
(1988 & Supp. 1997) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.2(2) (1996) (same); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-12.1-02(3) (1996) (same); Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 2744.01(B) (Anderson 1992
& Supp. 1995) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 152(5)(a)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997)
(same); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8501 (West 1982) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-
30(c) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) (same); S.D. CODIED LAws § 3-21-1(1) (Michie 1994)
(same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-107 (1988 & Supp. 1996) (same); TEx. CIV. PRAc.
& REm. CODE ANN. § 101.001(1) (1986) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2(2) (1993
& Supp. 1996) (same); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3(a) (1992) (same); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-
39-103(a)(iv)(B) (Michie Supp. 1996) (same); see also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44.073(15)
(1993) (declaring the Commonwealth not liable for acts of its independent contractors). As a
variation, New Mexico specifies that some limited categories of independent contractors are
within the scope of its governmental tort claims laws. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(F)(7),
(8), (10), (14) (1996) (covering private physicians, dentists, and psychologists under contract
at state prisons or in state-sponsored programs for children, youth, and families; private
directors of state health insurance pool board; and private persons in court-appointed special
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public entities that are defined in their enabling legislation as "sue-and-be-sued"
agencies sometimes do not enjoy the full range of immunities and limitations on
liability that blanket the principal departments of federal or state government. 72
Nevertheless, courts at times have derivatively extended the principles of
governmental immunity on a selective basis to private persons or entities acting
at the behest of a governmental authority.73 A few statutes also provide limited
immunities to government contractors in specific contexts. 74
One prominent illustration of such derivatively shared sovereign immunity
is the so-called "government contractor" defense in the law of products
liability. This defense has been fashioned to protect private suppliers to federal,
state, and local agencies from liability to third parties injured by their products
when various criteria are met that, in essence, show that the supplier was
faithfully adhering to product specifications mandated by their governmental
advocate programs). By contrast, Maine vests its public entities with discretion to defend and
to indemnify out of public funds, private service providers and landlords that have been sued
in tort actions arising out of their respective contracts with the government. See ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112(7) (West 1980).
72 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(0-(n) (1994) (excluding tort claims against Tennessee
Valley Authority, Panama Canal Co., federal land banks, intermediate credit banks, and other
specified federal "sue-and-be-sued" agencies from scope of FrCA); Bell v. Bell, 416 A.2d
829, 832-33 (N.J. 1980) (holding the Delaware River Port Authority, established as sue-and-
be-sued bi-state agency by an act of Congress, to be outside of the immunity protections of
New Jersey Tort Claims Act).73 See generally A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Right of Contractor with Federal, State or
Local Public Body to Latter's lmmunity from Tort Liability, 9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966 & Supp.
1996) (surveying state cases and laws extending such immunity to contractors). Contractors
on occasion also will assert, as a defense in private litigation, that they are "enveloped in the
cloak of the government's sovereign immunity" by virtue of indemnity obligations that the
government contractually owes to them. See MCBRIDE, sUPra note 9, § 3.10[7]. The courts
have been split on whether a private contractor sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating
federal rights under color of state law can invoke a "qualified immunity" defense like that
held by state officials in circumstances where the official acted in good faith. Compare
Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 965-66 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting qualified immunity
to a crisis center director conducting strip search at the request of police officer) with
McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying qualified immunity to
private prison operator). The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in McKnight
to settle this question. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 504 (1996).
74 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994) (immunizing private contractors on federal
projects from liability for patent infringement); Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United
States, 275 U.S. 331, 339 (1928) (applying § 1498); TVI Energy Corp. v. Blanc, 806 F.2d
1057, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (construing § 1498 immunity to extend to private parties bidding
on contracts with United States whether or not bidder is successful); see also Price-Anderson
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210-12 (1994) (conferring various limitations on third-party civil liability
of private entities contracted by United States to operate nuclear facilities).
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customers. In 1988, the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp.75 crafted such a federal immunity that can displace government
contractors' potential liability to third parties under state law for design defects
in military equipment. The immunity applies in circumstances where "(1) the
United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States
about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier
but not to the United States." 76
The Court's majority opinion in Boyle recognized that the United States
government itself is generally immune from design-defect liability under the
discretionary function exception77 to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).78
Given the policy decision of Congress to create such an immunity for the
government, the Court concluded that private contractors hired by the
government should at times derivatively share that immunity for those same
policy reasons. Those policy reasons involve what I have classified above as
substantive and fiscal concerns. As to the former, the government contractor
defense helps assure that private civil actions cannot be used to "second-guess"
and thereby undermine the government's necessary discretion in choosing
military hardware. 79 In addition, extending this sort of immunity to military
contractors prevents the financial burdens of civil judgments against such
contractors from being "passed through, substantially if not totally, to the
United States itself" in the form of higher prices.80 States have likewise
recognized similar immunities to shield private contractors that serve
government agencies.8'
75 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
76 Id. at 512.
77 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
78 SeeBoyle, 487 U.S. at 511. The Court observed that
the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed
Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of [section 2680(a)]. It
often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many
technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off
between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.
Id.
79 See id.
80 Id. at 511-12.
81 See Korpela, supra note 73 and state court cases cited therein; see also Cobb v.
Waddington, 380 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (holding road
contractor that had installed barricades that were struck by plaintiff motorist was entitled to
share public entity's statutory immunity for planning and designing highways, where the
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When its criteria are met, the government contractor defense espoused in
Boyle and in similar cases will result in treating the private contractor and the
government itself identically with respect to third-party liability. The premise of
Boyle is that when a private actor steps into the government's shoes, the actor
can take on some of the perquisites of sovereignty. If in certain contexts the
sovereign can "do no wrong" in the eyes of the law, then one might suppose
that neither can a private agent that is merely carrying out the sovereign's will
in those same contexts. By such reasoning, the substantive and fiscal reasons
that warrant immunizing government for certain conduct arguably should
likewise extend down the chain of delegated public functions. Boyle thus
envisions that accountability is achieved through the public's democratic control
over elected officials who, in turn, can exert control over government
contractors by holding them to the letter of strictly drafted contract terms.
Dean Cass and Professor Gillette have rightly criticized the reasoning of
Boyle as oversimplified.8 2 They have pointed out that the utility of Boyle's
government contractor defense largely depends on how one views the efficacy
of the public officials who administer those contracts. Advocates of government
contractor immunity optimistically assume, at least implicitly, that public
officials are "motivated by the public good and usually are able to secure it
without judicial intervention."'83 Under this view, applying routine tort
principles and other civil liability rules to make government contractors
accountable to the public at large may be "superfluous at best and pernicious at
worst."'84 Conversely, opponents of contractor immunity pessimistically regard
government procurement officers as bureaucrats who are often influenced by
goals other than the public's best interests and who thus are "unwilling or
unable" to structure and monitor contracts in a manner that maximizes the
public welfare. 85 From this competing perspective, "the threat of judicial
public entity had specified for the contractor the types and locations of the barricades). Accord
Miller v. United Tech. Corp., 660 A.2d 810, 819 (Conn. 1995) (applying Boyle government
contractor defense to facts involving military equipment purchased by United States from
private contractor for resale to a foreign government); Feldman v. Kohler Co., 918 S.W.2d
615, 627-30 ('ex. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming summary judgment based on Boyle immunity,
dismissing claim against a government contractor, but remanding as to other claims for which
triable issues of fact existed).
82 See Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense:
ContractualAllocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REv. 257, 261-69 (1991).
83 See id. at 260. Cass and Gillette describe this as the "Perfect Government Model."
See id. at 261.
84 See id.
85 Id. Cass and Gillette identify at least four other concerns that can replace social good
in motivating governmental actors: the maximization of their own agency budgets ("budget
maximization"), see id. at 321-25; the uncompromising advancement of the agency's
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oversight and imposition of liability is essential to induce contractors to behave
in a manner that coincides with the public interest." 86
Taking neither the absolutist course of optimism or pessimism, Cass and
Gillette propose that Boyle should be refined to apply immunity and liability
principles to government contractors in a more selective manner. They suggest
that when choosing between rules of contractor immunity or contractor liability,
we should look at the context of the governmental activity involved and then
tailor the rules accordingly. 87 They argue that this contextual approach is
preferable to adopting categorical immunity/liability rules for government
contractors founded either on a "perfect government" model (which assumes
that agencies will capably oversee those outside contractors in the public's best
interests) or on an equally rigid "interested actors" model (which distrusts the
capacity or willingness of allegedly self-serving public officials to police such
contractors).
As argued by Cass and Gillette with specific reference to the Boyle
government contractor defense, we ought to be selective in general in extending
sovereign immunity principles to private actors hired to undertake the people's
work. Courts and legislatures should not confer the immunities that protect
program goals even where it is not optimal to do so given the presence of other competing
public goals or concerns outside of the agency's mission ("program advancement"), see id. at
325-27; the desire to serve the special interests of the agency's "clients," such as political
leaders that support the agency or the industries that it may regulate ("client service"), see id.
at 327-33; or the personal desires or professional career interests of agency decisionmakers
("personal advancement"), see id. at 333-35. Cass and Gillette label this alternative model of
governmental behavior as the "Interested Actors Model." See id. at 262.86Id. at261.
87 See id. at 307. Specifically, Cass and Gillette argue for the following elaborate set of
default principles: (1) normal tort liability rules should apply when government is purchasing
standard, "off-the-rack" products from private suppliers; (2) normal tort rules should also
apply when government contracts to purchase consumer goods with public good features,
leaving open the possibility that the government may choose to indemnify such contractors if
it deems it necessary to atract sufficient suppliers of such goods when they can involve large
liability risks; (3) neither normal tort rules nor immunity rules are presumptively appropriate
for basic contracts involving specialized goods produced exclusively for the government, as
the selection of the proper rule should tam on the capacity of the contractor to exploit its near-
monopoly over the government; (4) immunity rules are preferable in "repeat-play" and
"phased-delivery" situations where private vendors supply specialty goods on a phased basis
that increases the leverage over them by government officers monitoring those contracts;
(5) no presumptive rule of liability or immunity ideally applies to "latency" situations where
the defect in the contractor's product will not materialize for a substantial time after its
manufacture; and (6) immunity rules should apply to contractors supplying goods with unique
military features, at least where government employees comprise the likely class of those who
risk injury from those products. See id. at 307-18.
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public entities in toto to every vendor who does business with the government.
After all, the very privatization of the function supposes that the vendor can do
a better job than the government can. That perceived comparative edge may
stem from the private contractor's flexibility to perform the function without
some of the operational constraints of government itself, such as internal agency
protocols, civil service regulations, public employee union rules, procurement
processes, dependency on centralized support services, and other red tape.
Given those apparent advantages, it seems unnecessary to insulate the private
vendor from liability to the fullest extent that the law insulates government
itself. Since the contractor is already used to facing liability exposure under
ordinary rules of law while it is engaged in its private work, there is little
reason to give it special protection in every instance when it happens to be on
"government time." If immunity were the rule and not the exception for such
contractors, their wrongful behavior might be underdeterred and victims of
their wrongful acts might be undercompensated.
Conversely, there are circumstances where it may be sensible, for
substantive and/or fiscal reasons, to provide government contractors with a
degree of protection from third-party liabilities when they are acting within the
scope of their assigned public functions. For instance, government may not be
able to obtain some especially hazardous products or services (e.g., nuclear
power or lethal military weapons) either at all or at acceptable prices unless it
offers private vendors some limitation on their potential liability for providing
it. There also can be situations when we do not want private vendors
discouraged from bidding on government work out of fear that they will be
unduly burdened by litigation niggling about their performance. Blanket
immunity, however, is not needed to accomplish this. As Cass and Gillette
demonstrate, Boyle in certain respects went too far in seeking ways to protect
government contractors that do not always need such liability protection.
Taking into account these considerations, the presumptive rule of law for
government contractors should be a principle of conventional liability rather
than immunity. Such a presumption best promotes the aforementioned vital
public objective of accountability. It should be overcome only in contexts where
it is demonstrable that holding government contractors accountable to third
parties under ordinary rules of civil liability would disserve even more vital
substantive or fiscal concerns.
If one thus accepts the view that the sovereign immunity principles that
shield public entities from certain liabilities should not be indiscriminately
extended to government contractors, it is not a far leap to posit further that
doctrines limiting or precluding private recovery of certain kinds of damages
against the government also should not be categorically extended. The damages
side of the equation should be approached no less selectively than the liability
side. Here again, to foster contractor accountability, the starting presumption
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should be to apply the ordinary law of damages to government contractors
found liable to third parties they injured in the course of their work. We should
cautiously depart from that presumption (and thereby extend to government
contractors the special rules that limit or preclude certain damages against
public entities) only where doing so will achieve other countervailing public
interests that outweigh the need to maximize the contractor's accountability.
As noted above, one of those "special" principles that traditionally protect
the sovereign in the realm of damages is the notion that punitive damages
usually are not recoverable from public entities. 88 The next section examines
the accountability notions that underlie punitive recovery in general and why
public entities typically have been deemed immune from such damages.
II. PUNrIVE DAMAGES As AN AccouNTABIrr DEVICE AND WHY
PuLiC ENTES ARE GENERALLY IMMUNE FROM THEM
A. Punitive Damages: Standards and Purposes
Punitive (or "exemplary") damages are sums assessed in civil litigation
against a wrongdoer over and above the compensatory damages needed to
make the injured plaintiff whole.89 They are most often awarded in tort cases
where the defendant has engaged in particularly egregious conduct, although
they also may be recoverable in rare instances of breach of contract9° as well as
in other civil matters where authorized by statute or judicial precedent. 91
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, "Punitive damages
may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition." 92 Typically, the standards for
punitive recovery require proof that the defendant acted in an extreme manner.
Depending on the jurisdiction, such extremity may be established by showing
that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous," 93  "willful," 94
88 See infra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
89 See e.g., KEErON Er AL., supra note 56, § 2, at9.
90 Ordinarily, "[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable."
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 355 (1981).
91 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1157-58
(Alaska 1989); Walker v. Gateway Nat'l Bank, 799 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
SHV Coal v. Continental Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 704-05 (Pa. 1991).
92 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996).
93 See, e.g., Nicholson, 777 P.2d at 1158; Walker, 799 S.W.2d at 617; S-V Coal, 587
A.2d at 704.
94 See, e.g., Fickling & Walker Co. v. Giddens Constr. Co., 376 S.E.2d 655, 659 (Ga.
1989); Kang v. Harrington, 587 P.2d 285, 291 (Haw. 1978); Pendowski v. Patent Scaffolding
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"oppressive," 95 "malicious," 96 "wanton," 97 in "reckless" or "conscious"
indifference to the interests of another,98 "aggravated," 99 "fraudulent," 100
"grossly negligent," 101 or otherwise egregious under the applicable legal
phraseology. In some contexts, the plaintiff seeking punitive recovery must
establish the extremity of the defendant's behavior by a heightened proof
standard of clear and convincing evidence. o2
Co., 411 N.E.2d 910, 911 (I. Ct. App. 1980); Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 514 P.2d
1180, 1183 (Nev. 1973); Reed v. Clark, 286 S.E.2d 384, 388 (S.C. 1982); Clayton v.
Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Utah 1982).
95 Sep, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060, 1076 (Ala. 1989);
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d 86, 90 (Cal. 1982); Oden v.
Russell, 251 P.2d 184, 187 (Okla. 1952); Mayer v. Frobe, 22 S.E. 58 (W. Va. 1895).
96 See, e.g., Gutridge v. Pen-Med, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 715 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967);
Bethel v. Van Stone, 817 P.2d 188, 195 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Smith v. Peterson, 282
N.W.2d 761, 767 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979); Pettengill v. Turo, 193 A.2d 367, 374 (Me. 1963);
Schaefer v. Miller, 587 A.2d 491, 492 (Md. 1991); Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d
66, 67 (N.H. 1972); Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 669 (R.I. 1990); Gardner v.
Kerly, 613 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Peacock Buick, Inc. v. Durkin, 277
S.E.2d 225, 227 (Va. 1981).
97 See, e.g., Holloway Constr. Co. v. Smith, 683 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Ky. 1984); Joachim
v. Crater Lake Lodge, Inc., 617 P.2d 632, 635 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Poling v. Wisconsin
Physicians Serv., 357 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
98 See, e.g., Wallace v. Dustin, 681 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ark. 1984); White v. Brock, 584
P.2d 1224, 1227 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978); Vandersluis v. Well, 407 A.2d 982, 986 (Conn.
1978); Hanks v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 493 N.W.2d 302, 311 (Minn. C. App. 1992).
99 See, e.g., O'Brien v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 401 N.E.2d 1356, 1359 (Ml. Ct.
App. 1980); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (N.C. 1976).
100 See, e.g., Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725, 740 (Mont. 1984); John
Deere Co. v. Nygard Equip., Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80, 95 (N.D. 1974); Leichtamer v.
American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 579 (Ohio 1981).
101 See, e.g., Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 734 P.2d 1258, 1264-65 (N.M. 1987);
Patrick v. Ronald Williams, Prof'l Ass'n, 402 S.E.2d 452, 459 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Inland
Container Corp. v. March, 529 S.W.2d 43, 44-45 (Tenn. 1975). But see White Constr. Co.,
v. DuPont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 1984) ( finding gross negligence alone insufficient to
warrant punitives); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979) (same).
102 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie 1996) (requiring proof of entitlement
to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(a) (West
Supp. 1997) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 1996) (same); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2315.21(C)(3) (Anderson 1995) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1996) (same); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986)
(construing state's common law to require clear and convincing proof for punitive damages);
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (Md. 1992) (same). Colorado goes even
further, statutorily requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a punitive damages
award. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1987).
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The rationale for the remedy of punitive damages is twofold.10 3 First,
punitive damages are literally aimed at punishing the defendant adjudged to
103 These dual purposes are recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) ("Punitive damages are damages, other
than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.")
(emphasis added).
David Owen has further subdivided the functions of punitive damages into five
categories: (1) education, (2) retribution, (3) deterrence, (4) compensation, and (5) law
enforcement. See David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and
Reform, 39 ViLL. L. REv. 363, 373-81 (1994) [hereinafter Owen, Overview]. I agree with
Professor Owen that all of those functions can be isolated, and at least four of them are very
important. For purposes of my own analysis, the educative and law enforcement aspects of
punitive damages awards are subsumed under what is described above as "deterrence." The
tendency for a punitive award to educate the defendant and others about the wrongfulness of
conduct, as well as the enforcement incentives created by making punitive recoveries
available to injured victims, both serve to deter future wrongful behavior. Retribution is
basically synonymous with what courts have most often called the "punishment" goal of
punitive damages, and I shall use those two terms here interchangeably.
As to compensation, there are undoubtedly times when a punitive damages award results
in compensating injured plaintiffs with funds that might cover all or part of those aspects of
their actual damages which, for some legal reason, they cannot collect through a
compensatory award. As identified by Owen, see id. at 378-79, and others, these ordinarily
nonrecoverable sums may include such things as nonquantifiable lost opportunities or
damaged personal relationships caused by the defendant's conduct, as well as plaintiff's
attorneys fees in cases where there is no statutory authority to shift those fees to the losing
defendant. See also Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in
Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REv. 741, 761-79 (1989) (examining the compensation
rationale for punitive damages as including, inter alia, loss of dignity suffered by victim);
David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MicH. L. REv. 1257,
1295-99 (1976). However, unlike the other cited purposes of punitive damages, it strikes me
that the incidental compensatory effect of a generous punitive award in offsetting such losses
for a particular plaintiff is more fortuity than design; jury instructions on punitive damages
tend to focus mainly on factors of punishment and deterrence, not compensation. See, e.g., 3
EDwARD J. DEvrrr Er AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSmUCTnoNS § 85.19 (4th ed.
1987) (mentioning nothing about any compensatory purposes in sample jury charge on
punitive damages). The distinctive feature of punitive damages is that they are imposed over
and above what the law of damages has defined (perhaps, indeed, too narrowly) as
"compensatory." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive
damages]" are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."); see also 1 JAMES
D. GHI ARDI & JoHN J. KIcRER, PuNmvE DAMAGES LAw AND PRACIICE, table 4-1, at 47-
52 (1995) (concluding that only three states recognize a compensatory function for punitive
damages).
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have engaged in wrongdoing. By compelling the defendant to "pay for" its
conduct with damages that exceed the compensatory sum required to make the
injured plaintiff whole (or, in some contract breach settings involving especially
flagrant conduct, exceeding the amount that would provide the plaintiff with the
full expected benefits of the original bargain), punitive damages exact a
measure of retribution. This penal effect can vindicate not only the rights of the
injured victim but also the interests of society at large in responding to wrongful
behavior with an exemplary sanction. The culpable defendant is singled out in
the judicial process as a wrongdoer, and forced to pay a penalty that recognizes
the severity of its conduct.
The second well-established rationale for punitive damages is deterrence,
both general and specific in nature. The threat of punitive damages is designed
to deter others generally from engaging in wrongful conduct akin to the
defendant's. The punitive award also is imposed to deter the defendant
specifically from repeating such egregious behavior in the future. These
deterrence notions reflect policy concerns that, absent punitive damages, merely
requiring an outrageous civil wrongdoer to pay only compensatory relief in the
few instances where the wrongdoer is actually sued and found liable for such
behavior will give such societal "bad actors" incentives to continue to flout their
legal duties. Without the added deterrent of punitive damages, the wrongdoer
may be willing to take its chances on being exposed, pursued, and held liable,
and may regard the exposure that it faces for simple compensatory damages
when it is "caught" by the civil justice system as an acceptable cost of doing
business. Punitive damages make the price of noncompliance much higher,
ideally in an amount that is sufficient to deter other instances in spite of the
inevitable fact that some extreme civil wrongs will evade legal redress.
The punishment and deterrence that can be achieved through imposing
punitive damages on private actors advance the societal goals of accountability.
To punish another is surely one means of making that party "account" for the
party's wrongful behavior. Further, to deter other wrongful behavior through
imposing civil penalties (at least on that segment of wrongdoers who have been
judicially held liable for it) can help foster accountability to the rule of law-in
general and with specific regard to the individual defendant. The remedy can
promote both respect for the law as well as more compliance with it. Or, to
state it conversely, without the prospect of punitive damages, private
wrongdoers may have even less reason to be accountable for their deviations
from legal norms.
For these reasons, I stick with the more conventional two-part justification of punitive
damages in my analysis herein, recognizing that the broad categories of punishment and
deterrence do incorporate many related subcategories.
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To be sure, the efficacy of our system of punitive damages has been widely
questioned. Commentators, 10 4 legislators, 105 and courts106 have all recently
advocated or taken measures to address perceived drawbacks in the application
of punitive damages liability in practice. At times juries have awarded punitive
damages that are in some sense disproportionate to the severity of the
defendant's behavior. Such excessive awards are subject, of course, to judicial
oversight, both at the trial level through postverdict motions and thereafter
through appellate review. In some cases, the procedures by which punitive
damages are imposed fail to meet constitutional standards of due process. Here
again, judicial oversight is available to check and remedy those deviations,
guided by the constitutional pronouncements of the United States Supreme
Court in a line of recent cases. 107 There are also concerns that in cases where
104 As a mere sampling, see, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't
Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1053 (1989) (contending that jury
awards of punitive damages are generally too delayed, inconsistent, and weak to deter
corporate wrongdoing); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury,
40 ALA. L. REv. 975 (1989) (criticizing current process of awarding punitive damages as
unconstitutional and unfair); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constittional Case for Reforming
Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269 (1983) (arguing for greater substantive
and procedural controls to ward against unconstitutionally imposed punitive damages). See
generally Owen, Overview, supra note 103 (summarizing and responding to criticisms of
punitive damages and reform proposals).
105 Many state statutes, for example, now limit the maximum sums recoverable as
punitive damages. See the discussion about such "caps," infra note 127 and accompanying
text.
106 For instance, the United States Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions in the
past decade pronouncing the constitutional limits on punitive damages recovery. See infra
note 107.
107 The Supreme Court has decided four cases in the last five years declaring that state
punitive damages awards are subject to federal constitutional review under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See BMW of North Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1996) (reversing as constitutionally excessive state court's $2 million punitive damages award
in consumer fraud action where plaintiffs actual damages were $4000); Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 512 U.S. 1162 (1994) (striking down state constitutional provision that had precluded
judicial review of punitive damages awards absent total lack of evidence to support the
verdict); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (finding that
$10 million punitive damages award was not so "grossly excessive" as to violate due process
in light of defendant's malicious and fraudulent course of conduct, and that state court's
procedures in making the award comported with due process); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (declaring that state punitive damages are constitutionally
reviewable under the Due Process Clause, but sustaining imposition of over $800,000
punitive damages award against insurer that was supportable with objective criteria and which
had been subject to a panoply of procedural protections in the state court).
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punitive damages are claimed for spurious reasons, innocent defendants may be
induced to factor a premium into their preverdict settlement offers to eliminate
the outside "wild-card" risk of punitive liability if the case were tried. Such
tactical abuse in threatening an adversary with punitive exposure can at least be
addressed, if not eliminated altogether, through a variety of means at the
disposal of the courts, the legislatures, and the litigants themselves. 108
Despite the difficulties of administering the law of punitive damages with
precision, forty-nine of the fifty states 09 continue to authorize the recovery of
such exemplary sums from private actors who have engaged in egregious
conduct. This widespread usage arguably reflects a consensus that the basic
policy justifications underlying punitive damages remain valid, even if the legal
system should do a better job in implementing those policies. It also reflects an
implicit recognition that the penalties that government itself might extract from
In striking down the punitive damages award in BMW, the Court articulated three factors
that led it to conclude the award was grossly excessive: (1) the limited degree of
reprehensibility of defendant's conduct in not disclosing that the car it sold to plaintiff had
been repainted; (2) the disparity between plaintiffs actual (or potential) harm and the amount
of punitive damages; and (3) the lesser magnitude of governmental penalties authorized to
sanction similar misconduct. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1598-1604. Admittedly, these factors
are difficult to administer in practice. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence
in this area signals that the Court will not allow state judgments for punitive damages to "run
wild." See Pacific Mut., 499 U.S. at 18; cf Browning-Ferris Indust. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (rejecting constitutional attack under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment on state punitive damages awards in cases involving only
private litigants).
108 For instance, the courts may strike punitive damages claims prior to trial where there
is no genuine basis in the allegations to justify such relief, may sanction attorneys when they
have made fivolous demands for punitive recovery, or may bifurcate trials to avoid tainting
jurors in the liability phase with evidence of the defendant's financial condition that would be
relevant only in the punitive damages phase.
109 Punitive damages are unrecoverable in Nebraska, having been declared invalid per se
under that state's constitutional limitation on penalties. See Distinctive Printing & Packaging
Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989). In addition, four states-Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington-disallow punitive damages except for
categories of cases where such recovery has been specifically authorized by statute. See
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 1-106 (West 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.16
(Supp. 1983); WAsH. REv. CODE § 64.34.100 (1994); Billiot v. BP Oil Co., 617 So. 2d 28
(La. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 645 So. 2d 604, 618 (La. 1994). Three of those
states disallowing punitives under the common law, however, do have various statutes that
legislatively permit their recovery in specific classes of cases. See LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art.
2315.4 (West 1976 & Supp. 1996) (authorizing punitive damages against wanton or reckless
drunk driver); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 199 (West 1996) (authorizing punitives for
failure to correct dangerous lead paint levels in dwellings); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.36.080 (West 1996) (allowing punitives in malicious harassment actions).
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societal wrongdoers, through criminal prosecutions or through regulatory
enforcement, need to be supplemented with civil sanctions imposed in private
suits by injured citizens. No matter how many statutes and regulations are
drafted with penalty provisions, those penalties are hollow if the government is
unable or unwilling to enforce them. Private litigation can aid in assuring that
the law is taken seriously by allowing "private attorneys general" to recover
punitive remedies in appropriate circumstances.
B. Why Public Entites Are Often Immune from Punitive Damages
The logic for punitive damages has been thought to collapse, however,
where a public entity is the defendant. The dual purposes of imposing such
damages-punishment and deterrence-do not as readily apply to the
government qua government as they do to a private actor. Since courts are an
instrument of the sovereign state, it seems rather oxymoronic for the sovereign
literally to be "punishing" itself, through allowing its courts to impose monetary
judgments for punitive damages against that very same sovereign.110 Unlike
private actors, the government possesses, in theory at least, unlimited powers to
raise funds through taxation. As a consequence of that power to tax, there may
be little or no retributive impact from slapping a public entity with punitive
damages. 11' The public entity may simply raise taxes (or reallocate taxpayer
110 The analogy to self-inflicted punishment is inapt, of course, where the public entity
defendant is not part of the same government whose court is awarding the punitive damages.
For example, a federal court would not be punishing the United States when it is asked to
impose punitive damages on a state or municipal public entity or on a foreign sovereign for
violations of federal law. States, however, are nevertheless constitutionally immune from such
damages in federal court absent a waiver under the Eleventh Amendment. In addition, foreign
sovereigns are immune from punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1996) (mandating, despite the general statutory waiver of foreign
states' sovereign immunities in the United States courts, that "a foreign state except for an
agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages"). The legislative
history to § 1606 reflects that such immunity from punitive damages "accords with current
international practice." H.R. RP. No. 94-1487, at 10 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6609.
111 The defendant's wealth has been widely recognized as a factor that a jury may
properly consider in assessing punitive damages. See RESrATSmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS,
supra note 103, § 908, cmt. e (stating that a defendant's wealth may be considered so that
"the degree of punishment or deterrence resulting from a [punitive] judgment is to some
extent in proportion to the means of the guilty person"). This factor may be misleading where
the defendant is a governmental entity that derives its "wealth" from tax revenues collected
from the public at large. The wealth of the sovereign in a representative democracy
theoretically is either the cumulative wealth of the people that may be taxed (since the people
ultimately fund their government's liabilities), or it is zero (since the government owns
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revenues from other programs) in an amount sufficient to absorb the liability.
Or the government may refuse to pay the punitive award, which may leave the
plaintiff judgment-creditor with little means of enforcement or vindication.
Under these scenarios, the government itself is not "hurt" by punitive damages;
any pain is instead felt by the public in the form of higher taxes or diminished
programs and services in other areas.
Second, it is debatable whether much deterrence can be gained by imposing
punitive damages on governments. Given the theoretically unlimited 12 power
of government to raise revenue, it would seem that there can be no amount of
punitive damages that could economically deter wrongful government
conduct. 113 Moreover, as noted above, other means exist in our democratic
system to create incentives for government actors to refrain from behaving
irresponsibly. Elected officials, after all, can be voted out of office despite the
strategic advantages of incumbency. They also can be motivated by public
opinion, the media, and others who will criticize them for engaging in wrongful
conduct or for not rectifying it when it is committed by their subordinates.1 14
Criminal prosecutions and legislative oversight also can check errant behavior
nothing independent of its people). Either characterization of the government's wealth
presents complications in calculating an award that will hurt and deter the sovereign.
1121 recognize that there are political and philosophical constraints on that theoretically
infinite power to tax. But unless the punitive damages award against the government is
ignored, those constraints signify the need to divert treasury dollars from other public uses in
order to pay it. The detrimental impact on other public services deprived of those funds
arguably could result in some deterrence of future governmental misdeeds that could produce
punitive recoveries. Governmental leaders theoretically would want to guard against such
future punitive exposures that could drain their treasuries even further. However, phenomena
such as the lingering deficit of the United States Government's budget and the recent
bankruptcies or near-bankruptcies of a number of municipalities and counties lead me to
conclude that political leaders are not as concerned about prospective liabilities in general as
they could or should be.
113 Punitive sanctions against the government arguably might produce some benefits in
general deterrence with respect to private actors who observe that even their own government
can be penalized for wrongdoing. This is the "exemplary" aspect of punitives. On the other
hand, private wrongdoers might perversely regard the government's ultimate ability to "get
away with" its own misdeeds by passing on its punishment to taxpayers or to the would-be
beneficiaries of other publicly funded programs as an additional reason for moral indifference
to the law.
114 Reining in the unelected subordinates that work for elected officials can be a
formidable task, given the constraints presented by public employee union contracts, civil
service rules, First Amendment limits on patronage, and the organizational quirks of large
public agencies. Nevertheless, as I noted earlier in this Article, see supra notes 31-42 and
accompanying text, public employees are still closer to the forces of democratic accountability
than commercial enterprises that are hired now and then by one or more public entities.
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by public officials. While these deterrence mechanisms are not perfect, and
some of them (such as adverse publicity and criminal laws) also can influence
the conduct of private actors, they do offer the means to discourage
wrongdoing in the public sector. As such, they abate the need in that arena for
punitive damages.
The United States Supreme Court embraced these arguments in holding
that municipalities are not subject to punitive damages in civil rights actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.115 In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,116 the
Supreme Court reasoned that neither the retributive nor deterrent aims of
punitive damages are well served when they are imposed upon a public entity.
As to punishment and retribution, Justice Blackmun's opinion of the Court
stated:
[IMt remains true that an award of punitive damages against a municipality
"punishes" only the taxpayer who took no part in the commission of the
tort.... Indeed, punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a
windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an
increase in taxes or a reduction in public services for the citizens footing the
bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited
upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.117
Justice Blackmun went on to question whether government itself can harbor the
requisite state of mind to be subject to punishment:
Under ordinary principles of retribution, it is the wrongdoer himself who is
made to suffer for his unlawful conduct. If a government official acts
knowingly and maliciously to deprive others of their civil rights, he may
become the appropriate object of the community's vindictive sentiments. ... A
municipality, however, can have no malice independent of the malice of its
officials. Damages awarded for punitive purposes, therefore, are not sensibly
assessed against the governmental entity itself. 118
With equal force, the Court in Newport cast aside the prospect that
imposing punitive damages on municipalities might be a worthwhile deterrent.
The Court expressed skepticism that public officials would be deterred from
wrongdoing by the notion that large punitive damages could be assessed based
on the wealth of their municipality. 119 Further, the Court found "no reason to
suppose that corrective action, such as the discharge of offending officials who
115 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
116 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
117 Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
118 Id. (emphasis added).
119 See id. at 269.
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were appointed and the public excoriation of those who were elected, will not
occur unless punitive damages are awarded against the municipality." 120 The
Court concluded that these democratic incentives to take corrective action,
coupled with the deterrence gained from imposing compensatory damages on
public entities and from imposing both compensatory and exemplary damages
on public officials individually, 121 make it unnecessary to impose punitive
damages on government itself. 122
Apart from these substantive reasons for immunizing public entities from
punitive damages, Newport also recognized what I have described above as
purely fiscal reasons for preserving a sovereign immunity. In its fiscal analysis,
the Court initially emphasized the very expansive range of governmental
activities that could trigger a punitive damages award:
[M]unicipalities and other units of state and local government face the
possibility of having to assure compensation for persons harmed by abuses of
governmental authority covering a large range of activity of everyday life. To
add the burden of exposure for the malicious conduct of individual government
employees may create a serious risk to the financial integrity of these
governmental entities. 123
Additionally, the Court expressed concern that juries, who could be
prejudiced' 24 by the realization that government's pockets are deep if not
120 Id.
121 The Court noted that many state laws requiring municipalities to indemnify their
employees for tort judgments arising out of official duties preclude such indemnification
where the judgments are based on the employee's malicious or willful misconduct. See id. at
270 n.30. This reference by the Court underscores the importance of the relationship between
principles of immunity from punitive damages and policies relating to the indemnification of
such damages. See infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
122 See Newport, 453 U.S. at 270-71.
12 3 Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
124 Jurors might also be prejudiced against public entity defendants out of sheer
dissatisfaction with government in general. Of course, other large institutions such as
multinational corporations, trade associations, labor unions, or organized religious bodies can
also be perceived by jurors as unpopular defendants. Judges can weed out some of these
prejudices by voir dire, juror instructions, or the remittitur or reversal of excessive punitive
verdicts. What makes the government unique, however, is that when these corrective judicial
measures fail to catch such juror excesses, the costs of the verdict are borne by all members
of the community rather than only those segments of the populace that happen to consume the
defendant corporation's product (or invest in or work for the corporation) or who are
members of the defendant labor union, and so on. The public at large is broader than any
identifiable constituencies of a single private enterprise, no matter how enormous it may be.
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unbounded, may inflate punitive damage awards against public entities to
catastrophic dimensions:
Because evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is traditionally admissible as a
measure of the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded, the
unlimited taxing power of a municipality may have a prejudicial effect on the
jury, in effect encouraging it to impose a sizable award. The impact of such a
windfall recovery is likely to be both unpredictable and, at times, substantial,
and we are sensitive to the possible strain on local treasuries and therefore on
services available to the public at large. Absent a compelling reason for
approving such an award, not present here, we deem it unwise to inflict the
risk.125
For these combined substantive and fiscal reasons, the Court in Newport
construed the federal civil rights laws in a fashion that provides defendant
public entities with absolute immunity from punitive damages. 126
In like manner and in a variety of substantive contexts, most states have
laws prohibiting the recovery of punitive damages from public entities.'127 At
least thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes fully or
partially immunizing public entities from punitive damages. 128 Other states have
125 Newport, 453 U.S. at 271-72 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
126 However, public employees remain subject to punitive damages in § 1983 actions.
See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31 (1983) (holding a state employee liable for
punitive damages in civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, despite nonrecoverability of
such damages under § 1983 from the state itself).
127 See generally 18 EUGENE McQu.LiN, THE LAW OF MuNICpAL CORpORA-TONS
§ 53.18.10, at 247-51 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that in the "overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions" punitive damages are not recoverable unless expressly authorized by statute);
Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Recovery of Exemplary or Punitive Damages from Municipal
Corporation, 1 A.L.R. 4TH 448 (1995) (collecting and analyzing cases in which municipal
corporations have been subject to punitive damages).
128 See ALA. CODE § 6-11-26 (1993) (stating that punitive damages are unrecoverable
from all public entities except for those covered under state Medical Liability Act); ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.04 (West 1996) (public entities immune from punitives); APK.
CODE ANN. § 21-9-203 (Michie 1996) (declaring state not liable to pay for punitive damages
awarded against state employees); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818 (West 1980) (public entities
immune from punitives); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114(4) (1990) (same); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 29-8a (1988) (disallowing state from indemnifying defense costs of state policeman
found liable for punitive damages); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1188.2 (1991) (eliminating liability
of district government for punitive damages in contract actions); id. § 1-1223 (immunizing
district from punitive damages in unjust imprisonment suits); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(5)
(West 1986) (mandating state and its agencies and subdivisions as immune from punitive
damages in tort actions); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-30 (1994) (state immune from punitive
damages in tort actions); HAW. REv. STAT. § 662-2 (1993) (same); IDAHO CODE § 6-918
19971
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
case law barring such recovery. 129 As the Supreme Court observed in Newport,
courts dating back to at least the nineteenth century have overwhelmingly
(1994) (governmental entities immune from punitives); IL. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, § 2-102
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (local public entities immune from punitives); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
16.5-4 (West 1983) (governmental entities immune from punitives); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 669.4 (West Supp. 1995) (state immune from punitives); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105(c)
(1989) (governmental entities immune from punitives); MNE. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 8105(5) (West 1980) (same); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 1A(b) (1994) (extending
immunity from punitives damages for municipal corporations in contract actions); MD. CODE
ANN., Cis. & JUD. PRoc. §§ 5-321(a), 5-322(a), 5-323 (1995) (making municipal
corporations, counties, and chartered counties immune from punitives in contract actions); id.
§ 5-399.2(a)(1), (d) (state immune from punitives in tort and contract actions); id. § 5-403(c)
(local governments immune from punitives); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West
1988) (public employers immune from punitives); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736(3) (West 1977)
(state immune from punitives); id. § 466.04(b) (municipalities immune from punitives); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 1995) (governmental entities immune from punitives); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 537.610(3) (West 1988) (public entities immune from punitives); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-9-105 (1977) (state and other governmental entities immune from punitives); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.035(1) (Michie 1996) (state, state agencies, and political subdivisions
immune from punitives); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:4(ll) (Supp. 1994) (eliminating
punitives recoverable against governmental units for bodily injury, personal injury, or
property damage); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-2 (West 1992) (public entities immune from
punitives); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(B) (Michie 1995) (governmental entities immune
from punitives in tort actions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.2-02(2) (1976) (declaring that state
immune from punitives and cannot be ordered to indemnify state employee for punitive
liability); Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2744.05(A) (Anderson 1992) (political subdivisions
immune from punitives); OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B) (West 1988) (state and political
subdivisions immune from punitives); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.270(2) (1993) (public bodies
immune from punitives); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (West 1982) (limiting
recoverable damages against Commonwealth to various categories of nonpunitive
compensatory relief); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(b) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995)
(governmental entities immune from punitives); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.024
(West 1988) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-24 (1986) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
195.3 (Michie 1995) (commonwealth and public transportation districts immune from
punitives); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7 (1995) (political subdivisions immune from punitives);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(3) (West 1983) (governmental subdivisions and agencies, political
corporations, and volunteer fire companies immune from punitives); Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-
118(d) (1995) (governmental entities immune from punitives).
129 See, e.g., Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1106-08 (N.Y. 1982)
(declaring that state's general waiver of sovereign immunity did not expose it and its political
subdivisions to punitive damages, noting that the twin justifications of deterrence and
punishment for such damages are not advanced when defendant is a public entity); see also
Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 465-66 Alaska 1986) (adopting
reasoning of Newport in holding that punitive damages are unrecoverable under state law
from Alaska municipalities); Tipton County Bd. of Educ. v. Dennis, 561 S.W.2d 148, 152-
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treated public entities as immune from punitive damages.130 In applying this
immunity, state courts have shared the Supreme Court's belief that the
retributive and deterrent purposes underlying punitive damages do not aptly
relate to defendants that are governmental entities.
The federal government likewise has been shielded in various respects from
punitive damages. The FTCA, which was first enacted in 1946, waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States from private tort claims but explicitly
precludes its liability for punitive damages. 131 The FTCA's punitive immunity
is of major significance because tort claims are a frequent vehicle of recovery
for persons injured by governmental conduct. Nor are punitive damages
recoverable against federal agencies in breach of contract actions. 132 Similarly,
federal instrumentalities that have "sue-and-be-sued" status (such as the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Tennessee Valley Authority) are
presumed to be immune from punitive damages in the absence of express
statutory authorization subjecting them to such liability. 133 Additionally, courts
53 (Ten. 1978) (adopting, as the common law of Tennessee, the "weight of authority" that
deems punitive damages unrecoverable from municipal or local governments on grounds of
public policy).
130 Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1981).
131 'Me very first sentence of the FTCA declares that "[t]he United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (emphasis
added).
132 There do not appear to be any reported cases from the Court of Federal Claims or
from other federal courts in which punitive damages were imposed on the United States
Government as a remedy for its breach of contract. This dearth of precedent is not surprising,
since punitive awards are exceedingly rare even in private contract suits. Moreover, if courts
followed the principle of section 355 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, they would
only impose punitive damages in those contract actions in which the conduct of the federal
agency constituting the breach also amounted to a flagrant tort. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACrs, supra note 90, § 355. Since the United States is immune under the F1TCA for
punitive damages in tort cases, and generally immune under the FTCA for many forms of
intentional torts by its employees, it stands to reason that a court would find the imposition of
punitive damages in a contract case against the government would contravene the purposes of
those statutory provisions.
133 See Springer v. Bryant, 897 F.2d 1085, 1089 (11th Cir. 1990) (TVA immune from
punitive damages); Commercial Fed. Sav. Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 872 F.2d
1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1989) (FDIC immune); Smith v. Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 765
F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1985) (punitive immunity for production credit associations formed
under 12 U.S.C. § 2093(4)(1982)); Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 837 F. Supp. 121,
122 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Red Cross, as sue-and-be-sued federal instrumentality, did not waive
sovereign immunity from punitive damages). See generally Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v.
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are reluctant to imply from ambiguous or general statutory language a waiver
of the government's traditional immunity from punitive liability.134
The picture that emerges is that public entities at all levels of government
are substantially insulated from liability for punitive damages. Although that
immunity principle is not universal t35 it is certainly dominant. That dominance
reflects widespread judicial and legislative determinations that the accountability
of public entities can and should be achieved by methods other than trying to
impose some form of punishment on those sovereignties when they violate their
own laws.
IV. PUNIVE DAMAGES LIABILrrY As AN ACCOUNTABILIrY MECHANISM
IN AN ERA OF PRIVATIZATION
As described at the outset of this Article, the number of governmental
functions performed exclusively by public employees may well be on the wane.
Commercial enterprises are stepping in the breach. In this era of mounting
interest in the privatization of public services, should the rules of the game that
insulate the government from punitive damages be left intact when a private
contractor fills government's shoes? Or should the enterprise be treated as it
normally is treated in private litigation, i.e., exposed to punitive damages when
its conduct meets the applicable legal standards of egregiousness?
To date, the reported law directly addressing these specific issues is sparse
and unenlightening. A few statutes do confer immunity from punitive damages
on government contractors engaged in specified activities. 136 There have also
Ault, 256 U.S. 554 (1921) (holding federal instrunentalities that are generally subject to suit
are immune from penalties authorized under federal law absent express congressional waiver
of such immunity).
134 See, e.g., United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1994) (holding that
federal agencies are not liable for civil penalties for violations of water pollution laws because
applicable statutes contain no clear expression of a waiver of sovereign immunity from such
penal liabilities); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
135 Since 1991, for example, federal agencies have been potentially liable for punitive
damages for violations of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994); Accord
Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 964-65 (N.J. 1994) (holding
that public entity employers are not immune from punitive damages under state's
whistleblower statute).
136 For example, the Price-Anderson Act, as amended in 1988, limits the ability of third
parties to obtain punitive damages in suits against government contractors that operate nuclear
power facilities, precluding such punitive recoveries to the extent that they would be high
enough to expose the "layer" of indemnification that the United States contractually
guarantees to nuclear operators under the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (1994). As a state
illustration, Nevada law expressly bars the recovery of punitive damages from private
contractors that provide medical services for the state department of prisons. See NEv. REv.
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been some cases in which judges have foreclosed, or at least called into
question the efficacy of, an award of punitive damages against government
contractors.1 37 With privatization on the rise in heavily populated public
STAT. § 41.0307(3)(b) (1996) (defining "immune contractors"); id. § 41.035(1) (disallowing
punitive damages against such contractors). In addition, it might be argued-in my view
erroneously-that states with tort claims statutes that generally immunize public entities and
their agents from punitive damages have implicitly created a derivative immunity from
punitive liability for government contractors if such contractors are not specifically excluded
from the definitional scope of those statutes. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.137 In the consolidated Agent Orange products liability litigation brought by military
personnel against manufacturers that supplied defoliant chemicals to the United States
Government, the defendants had argued that they should not be liable for punitive damages
because of their role as government contractors. In addressing that argument in the context of
plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Federal Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of
New York raised policy concerns about the propriety of awarding punitive damages against
the defendant contractors:
Finally, there may be a policy against substantial punitive damages in a case such as this.
An award of huge punitive damages might discourage government contractors from
bidding for defense contracts and manufacturing material vitally needed for the national
defense and might "seriously impair" the government's ability to formulate policy and
make judgments pursuant to its war powers.
Evidence that the government had almost as much, if not more, knowledge of the
dangers posed by Agent Orange, and control by the government of its use are among the
additional factors that would argue against punitive damages. It would be unfair to
punish the defendants while the government, which might be equally, or even more,
culpable, avoided all liability. Finally, merely instructing the jury as to punitive damages
may distort the juror perceptions and make the case even more difficult to control.
In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 727-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(citations omitted). Despite these reservations, Judge Weinstein went on to conclude, without
expressly indicating why, that "[n]evertheless, there is a substantial probability that limited
punitive damages may be allowed." Id. at 728. Ultimately, Judge Weinstein did not need to
resolve the punitive damages issue in Agent Orange because the class action settled for $180
million before trial. See In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). The federal court not only approved
the class settlement, but also rejected, on grounds of Feres immunity, the defendant
contractor's third party claims against the United States for contribution and indemnity of the
settlement funds. See In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1221
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1987).
For the reasons explained in this Article, see infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text,
Judge Weinstein's stated qualms about awarding punitive damages against government
contractors are (as he himself apparently was inclined to conclude) unpersuasive. No matter
how vital an outsourced governmental need may be, it still is important to ensure that the
private vendor filling that need remain accountable and that it refrain from egregiously
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domains such as schools, prisons, and hospitals where many people are apt to
be injured (and thereafter bring associated tort litigation), it is likely that the
issue of shielding government contractors from punitive damages will arise
more frequently. Injured citizens who in the past had sought punitive damages
from government employees will now pursue such damages from the private
entities that have taken over the government agency's operations. Concern over
punitive damages is surely apt to come up more at the bargaining table in
negotiating indemnity provisions in government contracts, 138 particularly in the
wrongful behavior in the course of its public duties. As I argue, infra notes 152-67, there are
potential ways through the bid process and through judicial oversight of jury awards to reduce
any harmful side effects of leaving government contractors subject to punitive damages.
Moreover, the court's eventual decision refusing to compel the Government to indemnify the
contractor's settlement shares in Agent Orange reinforces my point that the government
contractor, rather than the taxpaying public, should generally bear the risks of causing tortious
injury, even if the taxpayer-supported government agencies involved might also share in the
blame.
In another context, the Third Circuit has shielded government contractors of nuclear
facilities from punitive damages in those instances where the government would be required,
pursuant to the federally funded scheme of excess "insurance" for nuclear disasters, to
indemnify the contractor for that liability. See In re Three Mile Island Litig., 605 F. Supp.
778, 784 (M.D. Pa. 1985), aft'd, 67 F.3d 1119 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1034
(1996). Three Mile Island essentially treats the punitive damages question for nuclear
accidents occurring before the 1988 Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act (such as the
1977 disaster at Three Mile Island) in the same fashion as nuclear accidents occurring after
the effective date of the 1988 Amendments. As indicated, supra note 74, the 1988
Amendments conferred on nuclear facility licensees and contractors a limited statutory
immunity from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s). But see Cook v. Rockwell Int'l,
755 F. Supp. 1468, 1481-82 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding that private contractors at fault in pre-
1988 nuclear incidents may be held fully liable for punitive damages in spite of potential
governmental indemnity, expressly disagreeing with the Three Mile Island court because of
"the long line of cases holding that an indemnity agreement does not cloak a private party
with sovereign immunity"); Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439, 447 (S.D.
Ohio 1989) (holding that a contractor is not immune from punitive damages for pre-1988
nuclear incident). Because of the unique statutory context of contracts involving nuclear
facilities under the Price-Anderson Act, the courts' punitive damages rulings in Three Mile
Island may be regarded as idiosyncratic. Moreover, as the district courts observed in Cook
and Crawford, and as I try to demonstrate below, there is no conceptual reason (absent a
statutory mandate such as that contained in the amended Price-Anderson Act for post-1988
nuclear incidents) to tie a government contractor's susceptibility to punitive damages to its
contractual indemnification rights against the government. Indeed, as a policy matter, I
contend below that such indemnification normally should be disfavored. See infra notes 163-
64 and accompanying text.
138 See Frank P. Grad, Contractual Indemnification of Government Contractors, 4
ADmiN. L.J. 433, 436 (1991) ("[I]t is likely that with the emergence of greater hazards in
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growing number of states that have passed laws generally authorizing the
indemnification of punitive damages. It also is likely to draw more attention in
legislatures or courthouses in the form of statutes or case law that would extend
the government's punitive damages immunity derivatively to its contractors, just
as other immunities and special defenses have been extended in Boyle and
elsewhere to contractors and other agents of the state.
A. Punitive Damages as a "Bottom Line" Inducement to Contractors
For a number of reasons, the temptation to confer such protection from
punitives upon government contractors should be resisted. First, one must recall
why punitive damages exist in the first place: as a mechanism of accountability
to punish and deter flagrant violations of the law that injure others. The more
that a society values the goal of accountability, the more attractive legal
measures such as punitive damages become. Punitive damages are one way to
curb wayward conduct and to make wrongdoers account for their misdeeds.
Because the nature of such punishment is monetary, punitive damages ought to
be of particular concern to business enterprises-which exist and are principally
motivated to turn profits. Such damages directly affect a firm's financial well-
being, particularly where they are calibrated appropriately to make the firm
"sting" by reason of its wrongful conduct.
As we have seen, the government's traditional immunity from punitive
damages is founded upon substantive and fiscal notions that appear unique to
the sovereign itself. The government's elastic capacity to raise or divert
revenues that could pay off virtually any punitive damages award is not shared
by private actors. Nor is government's mission centrally defined by how much
money it can make. Indeed, government has been comparatively indifferent at
times to its budgetary deficits. Moreover, the government is accountable to the
electorate that it serves through political means rather than economic means. 139
So when a private enterprise that wins a government contract steps in to
take on a public function, there is a quite dissimilar legal actor filling that role.
Instead of a politically motivated, tax-collecting sovereign institution running
the public schools, or the prisons, or the vehicle inspection lines, we can have a
profit-maximizing, tax-paying private institution doing the job for us. That
government contracting activities, there will be greater pressure to secure contractual
indemnities.").
139 Krent has observed that "[als a non-profit-maximizing actor, the government does
not respond as directly to monetary signals." Krent, supra note 50, at 1539. Nevertheless,
unlike private entities, "the government acts subject to considerable political checks and
balances," mechanisms which Krent suggests "may serve as substitutes for private lawsuits to
deter arbitrary government action." Id. at 1540.
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private vendor is a creature in many ways unlike the government bureaucracy
that it replaced. It thrives on different sustenance and it responds to different
stimuli. It is not, in short, the sovereign. In fact, the fundamental distinctions
between private and public organizations usually are cited as a main argument
for privatizing itself: to achieve market incentives and efficiencies that cannot
be duplicated by government agencies in-house.
We care enormously about many of the services that modem government
has customarily provided to us: education, national defense, police protection,
transportation systems, aid for the poor, the aged, and the infi, and so on.
The accountability of those who supply those public services is likewise of
paramount importance. The very fact that these societal needs heretofore have
been addressed, at least in part, by the government is indicative that leaving the
fulfillment of those needs entirely to the private market has its shortcomings. In
contracting out these activities, accountability mechanisms that are available
under the law presumptively should be enhanced rather than diminished.
As was pointed out previously, 14° government often lacks the resources,
the expertise, the knowledge, or the will to rein in its contractors effectively.' 4 '
140 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. By way of further illustration, Marina
Lao has highlighted various reasons why the Defense Department's control over large defense
contractors has not been as vigilant as it could be. See Lao, supra note 45, at 359-60 (noting
that Pentagon officials have lower incentives to contain costs than private actors, are prone to
political "capture" by their contractors in working with them jointly to secure congressional
appropriations, and can be influenced by "revolving door" personal relationships with defense
firms that may be their former or future employers).
141 Returning to the leash metaphor used above, one might envision a pet owner trying
to control her two dogs with two leashes as she walks down the street. Imagine that the owner
is holding a leash to her first dog. Now her other dog is added to the picture, and the owner
ties a second leash directly from her first dog to that second dog. In such circumstances it will
be tremendously difficult for the owner to exert any control over the second dog because her
connection to the second dog is only indirect. If the first dog's leash is too loose, that dog may
stray and thus enable the second dog to wander even further out of the owner's control.
Alternatively, even if the first leash is tight, the second dog will still be able to stray far from
the owner if its own leash to the first dog is loose. The owner's control over the second dog
vastly improves, however, if the owner holds a leash tied directly to that dog.
By analogy, one might think of the public's control over government contractors in the
same manner. If the public is the "owner," it cannot gain much control over a government
contractor (i.e., the second dog) by merely leashing that contractor to some government
agency (i.e., the first dog). The public's own leash (i.e., the electoral process) that ties it to
the government agency may be too loose to be effective. Likewise, even with tighter public
controls over the agency, the leash that connects the private contractor to that agency (i.e., the
procurement contract) may be too loose. By allowing citizens to sue government contractors
that have wrongfully inflicted injury, we in effect give the public a direct leash to such
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Even where government is able and willing to serve in this oversight role, the
best-drafted procurement contracts may still have loopholes that enable private
vendors to evade effective agency scrutiny. The government might have a right
to collect liquidated damages from the breaching vendor under its contract, but
such recovery will be limited by the longstanding tenet that liquidated damages
clauses will not be enforced if they amount to a penalty.' 42 At best, government
oversight is imperfect, 143 and it is liable to worsen as political trends push
government itself to downsize and to spin off more and more of its functions.
Recognizing these limitations of government oversight, it makes sense to
turn to supplemental forces to check contractor abuse. Specifically, this should
include private litigation by citizens who are the intended beneficiaries of the
public services that the contractors provide, or who are otherwise affected by
the conduct of those contractors. Indeed, the people actually served and affected
by the contractor on a day-to-day basis-the students, the patients, the inmates,
the soldiers, the passengers, the consumers, and so on-may be in the optimal
position to recognize contractor defalcations first-hand and have the greatest
incentive to do something about it.
Tort suits, third-party beneficiary contract claims, 144 and other civil actions
against contractors by the users of government services (or other persons
contractors. Without such a direct mode of restraint, the public's control over government
contractors simply can be too attenuated.
142 See, e.g., Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947)
(precluding the federal government from collecting liquidated damages from a contractor if
they inflict a penalty); see also RFsATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACms supra note 90, § 356
("A [contract] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy as a penalty."); UCC § 2-718 (1) ("A [contract] term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.").
143 Even where a government contractor is caught mismanaging its contractual duties,
the contractor may not suffer at the hands of the government. For example, the private vendor
that mismanaged the federal immigration detention facility in New Jersey reportedly was
allowed by the INS, after the riot had subsided and the facility closed down, to transfer its
contract with the United States to another company for $6.2 million. See Purdy & Dugger,
supra note 1, at A18. On learning of the transaction, the local congressman remarked, "I
think it's the wrong public policy for someone to walk away with $6 million when they
haven't done the right thing." Id. (quoting Rep. Robert Menendez). Absent some other
justification for this result that was not reported in the press, the scenario aptly illustrates the
hazards of total reliance upon government oversight of its contractors.
144 Note, however, that third-party beneficiary claims by private citizens against
government contractors are at times circumscribed by legal principles that may preclude such
recovery or limit the scope of recoverable damages. See, e.g., RESTATEMENr (SEcoND) OF
CONTRACrs, supra note 90, § 313 (disallowing such third-party beneficiary claims against
government contractors where they would "contravene the policy of the law authorizing the
[government] contract or prescribing remedies for its breach" and stating a general
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sufficiently affected) can provide a vital supplement to the government's own
efforts at contractor oversight.' 45 Compensatory damages alone may be
insufficient to deter contractors from wrongful conduct, particularly since a
number of injured persons who could bring successful tort actions against
contractors will choose not to sue, thereby making it less costly overall for the
wayward contractor to persist in its wrongs. 146 Punitive damages thus should be
included in the panoply of civil remedies recoverable by those injured persons
who do file suit in order to enhance this ancillary means toward contractor
accountability.147
presumption in such third-party cases against the award of consequential damages to a
member of the public unless such relief is expressly called for in the contract or is otherwise
shown to be consistent with the contract and with public policy). This still leaves room, of
course, for private citizens to plead alternative theories against a government contractor, such
as tort or the violation of a remedial statute.
14 5 Ironically, this is in a sense partially privatizing the government's function of
overseeing its own contractors.
146 See David Friedman, An Economic Explanation of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1125, 1131-35 (1989) (explaining how the transactional costs of litigating punitive
damages cases will economically justify increasing the level of punitive damages in those
cases that are actually prosecuted).
147 A parallel accountability mechanism to discourage fraud by federal contractors
is qui tam litigation brought by private citizens under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730 (1996). See Erickson v. American Inst. of Bio. Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 909
n.1 (E.D. Va. 1989) (noting that the term "qui tam" is derived from the Latin
expression "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," meaning
"who brings an action for the king as well as himself"). Subject to various procedural
limitations, the False Claims Act authorizes private suits in the name of the United
States against parties who have defrauded the federal government, and offers what are,
in essence, monetary rewards to private citizens (described as "relators") who
successfully prosecute such actions. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1996). Those rewards may
include, depending upon the circumstances and the government's role (if any) in the
litigation, up to 30% of the proceeds recovered from the fraudulent defendant. See id.
§ 3730(d). In such actions the defendant's liability can include treble damages, a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 per violation, id. § 3729(a)(7), plus the prevailing plaintiff's
attorney's fees and costs, see id. § 3730(d). Since 1986, when the Act was amended to
make it more attractive to potential relators, see generally Richard J. Oparil, The
Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REv. 525 (1989)
(discussing amendments to the False Claims Act), the number of qui tam suits and
recoveries have risen dramatically. See, e.g., Paul Reidinger, Fraud Doctors, 82
A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (1996) (reporting Justice Department data showing that filed qui tam
actions rose from 60 cases in fiscal year 1988 to 221 cases in fiscal year 1994, and that
recoveries had climbed from $2 million to $379 million during same period). Just as the
specific enhanced recoveries statutorily obtainable by private citizens in qui tam
litigation can help check fraudulent behavior by federal contractors, so too can the
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There is a certain even-handedness in denying government contractors a
legal exemption from punitive damages. Such contractors are displacing public
agencies that, for reasons noted above, may be comparatively hamstrung by
bureaucratic norms in performing the function in question. We have outsourced
the function presumably because we expect that the private contractor will do a
better job at it. The contractor enjoys all the advantages of its private sector
status in working to achieve those expected improvements, and is compensated
with taxpayer dollars for the effort. But when such a contractor fails to perform
its public duty-not by some slight measure, but in an egregious way that
conjures up the adjectives (e.g., willful, wanton, outrageous, and the like) that
courts use to characterize behavior deserving of punitive damages148-we are
surely not better off and probably worse off. In such instances of proven
wrongdoing by a contractor, there is a rough justice obtained in forcing the
contractor to bear the brunt of punitive damages, just as it would have to bear
them in its private-sector affairs. The defalcating contractor in such a scenario
can hardly claim it unfair to be treated as it would normally be treated in a
totally private setting. Exposing it to punitive damages is merely asking it to
accept a commensurate measure of risk while it is reaping the rewards of public
compensation.
Before conclusively endorsing the punitive damages remedy in this context,
however, one should ask whether the substantive and fiscal reasons that have
traditionally exempted public entities from punitive damages apply perforce to
private enterprise acting as government contractors. The answer is no.
Punishing a government contractor is not the same as trying to punish the
government itself. The private contractor is only a subject of the sovereign. Its
assets are privately, not publicly, owned. Those private assets may be attached,
through court process, to pay a delinquent court judgment for punitive
damages. When its assets are taken for that purpose, the private enterprise
suffers a setback in its core mission to accumulate wealth for its owners. That
economic mission differs fundamentally from the democratic mission of
government.
Retribution is served by singling out a government contractor for its
egregious conduct, particularly since that conduct occurred in the course of its
duties to the public. 149 The wayward contractor has betrayed the trust of the
general common law remedy of punitive damages help check fraud and other egregious
conduct by contractors at all levels of government.148 See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
149 This exemplary aspect parallels criminal sentencing approaches that enhance the
penalties for crimes when they are committed by public officials or by private actors engaged
in a public function. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELiRNs MANUAL, § 2C1.1 to .7
(setting high severity factors for offenses involving public officials or interference with
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public that has come to depend upon its work in an era of privatization. Once
that trust is betrayed, there is virtue in having the wrongdoing contractor
publicly chastised through a court judgment imposing a sizable financial
penalty. The punitive damages award "sends a message" that such patently
offensive conduct is to be dealt with severely.
Deterrence also should be more likely to result from imposing punitive
damages on a private contractor than where the defendant is a public entity. If
the contractor is a for-profit entity, 150 it should be responsive to a legal
exposure designed to hit it-and forcefully so-in its pocketbook. The private
firm does not enjoy the government's virtually unbounded legal authority to
raise tax revenues or to tap treasury reserves. The firm and those who manage
it are, in turn, answerable to the firm owners for having to pay a punitive
award. General deterrence objectives are also promoted, as other would-be
bidders on government contracts witness the harsh punitive sanctions imposed
through the courts on other vendors that have behaved wrongfully. In sum, the
justifications articulated in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.151 for immunizing
public entities from punitive damages simply do not apply to government
contractors.
governmental functions); id. § 3B1.3 (providing, inter alia, for an aggravating factor
adjustment if the defendant abused a position of public trust); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 240.0(7) (defining "public servant," for purposes of Code provisions on offenses against
public administration set forth therein in articles 240-43, to include not only government
employees and officers, but also "any person participating as juror, advisor, consultant or
otherwise, in performing a governmental function" except for mere witnesses); State v.
Vickery, 646 A.2d 1159, 1160 (N.J. Super. 1994) (treating private citizen that was member
of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals as a "public servant" for purposes of
state's official misconduct statute).
150 As indicated above, supra note 30 and accompanying text, my analysis focuses on
the more common situation where a for-profit private firm is hired by the government rather
than a charitable or nonprofit organization. There will be fewer beneficial incentives created
by subjecting nonprofit entities (which are presumably more driven by goals other than
financial prosperity) to punitive liability, and more disadvantages flowing from the indirect
impact of such penalties on the sponsors and beneficiaries of those organizations. See Daniel
A. Barfield, Note, Better to Give Than to Receive: Should Nonprofit Corporations and
Charities Pay Punitive Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 1193, 1208-32 (1995) (highlighting
problems with imposing punitive damages on charitable and nonprofit organizations but
disfavoring extending to such entities immunity from punitives because of countervailing
deterrent benefits).
151 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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B. Dealing with Direct and Indirect "Pass-Throughs" of Punitive
Liability
The above analysis is complicated by what can be called the "pass-
through" problem. This can arise in at least two ways: direct indemnification 152
of punitive damages by the government agencies that hired the private
contractor, or the indirect pass-through of the risks of punitive liability reflected
in higher prices bid to undertake the government's work. If the costs of punitive
damages are effectively passed on to the government, and ultimately to the
taxpayers, the arguments favoring public entity immunity from such damages
would seem to be derivatively applicable to government contractors as well.
However, for the reasons that follow, the opportunities for such pass-through
may at least be limited if not eliminated.
Indemnification of punitive damages as a general matter, whether it be in
the private or public sectors, has long been prohibited or disfavored. 153 While
this traditional hostility to punitive indemnification has been eroding with new
case law and the passage of statutes154 that legalize insurance coverage for
punitive risks, at least fifteen states still ban such coverage in all or most
circumstances. 155 The policy reasons disfavoring indemnification for punitive
152 At the federal level, there is no legislation that comprehensively provides for the
indemnification of government contractors but rather a patchwork of statutes, rules, and
practices that authorize indemnities in certain specific contexts. See generally Grad, supra
note 137, at 443-80 (surveying patchwork of indemnity provisions that variously apply to
federal providers of military supplies, nuclear energy, space equipment, swine flu vaccine, art
exhibits, Superfund cleanps, and other miscellaneous activities).
153 See, e.g., KEErON Er AL., supra note 56, § 2, at 13 (noting that many jurisdictions
traditionally found such indemnification would defeat the deterrent and retributive purposes of
punitive damages); Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage As
Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 11 (1982)
(surveying jurisdictions allowing and disallowing indemnification). See generally Alan I.
Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages?: Discerning Answers to the
Conundrum Created by Disputes Involving Conflicting Public Policies, Pragmatic
Considerations and Political Actions, 39 ViiL. L. REv. 455 (1994) (surveying state law on
the invalidity of punitive damages liability coverage and arguing that the availability of such
insurance will not substantially diminish the purposes of punitive damages awards).
154 See, e.g., MONT. CODE AN. § 33-15-317(1) (1995) (allowing coverage for punitive
damages if specifically included in insurance policy terms); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-41-50(A)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (allowing insurers to cover, as well as to limit or exclude coverage for,
punitive damages); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2051 (1992) (allowing downhill ski resorts to
obtain insurance against punitive damages).
155 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,115 (1993); Ohio REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.182
(Anderson 1989); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257, 260-61 (D. Conn. 1965)
(applying Connecticut law); Ruffin v. Sawchyn, 599 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
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damages are fairly obvious ones. If the aims of punitive damages are to punish
and deter civil wrongdoers, those aims are frustrated if the wrongdoer can
simply hand off its monetary sanction to an insurance company or to some
other indemnitor. The law of punitive damages wants the would-be wrongdoer
to worry about having to pay such penalties and not to regard it casually as just
another cost of doing business. 156
Government at times has indemnified punitive damages for one class of
persons: public employees. The experience here is mixed: at least eight states
absolutely prohibit such indemnification,' 57 while nine or more allow it,158
Other states permit the indemnification of punitive damages only where the liability of the
party seeking indemnity was merely vicarious. See, e.g., City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem.
Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (Ct. App. 1979); United States Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould,
437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 245 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Il.
Ct. App. 1969); Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F.
Supp. 92, 95 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (applying Indiana law); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (N.Y. 1994); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Okla. 1980); Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 793, 799
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).
156 Even with indemnification, the tortfeasor may not regard punitive damages exposure
so lightly. For one thing, there are the exemplary consequences of being publicly sanctioned,
in terms of loss of reputation, corporate image, and the like. The tortfeasor hit with a punitive
award covered by insurance may also suffer in the future by having to pay increased
premiums for that coverage or find itself unable to obtain future coverage after its loss
experience.
157 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-203 (Miechie 1996) (allowing state to only indemnify
employee for actual, but not punitive, damages); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-8a (West
1990) (declaring state not liable to indemnify defense costs of state policeman in civil rights
action if police officer is found liable for punitive damages); 745 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN.
10/2-102 (West 1995) (stating that local public entities may not be held "directly or
indirectly" liable to pay punitive damages); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 18(4)(c) (McKinney
1988) (public entities not authorized to indemnify employees for punitive damages); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-12.2-02 (1995) (state cannot be ordered to indemnify a state employee held
liable for punitive damages); S.D. COD='ID LAws § 3-22-7 (Michie 1995) (state public entity
liability pool fund not liable to indemnify punitive damages claims); see also City of West
Haven v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 495, 497-501 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (interpreting
Connecticut law as prohibiting public entity's indemnification of punitive damages imposed on
one of its employees, the court observing that "[tihe very nature of punitive damages makes it
inappropriate to require [a] municipality to assume the burden"); Sharapata v. Town of Islip,
437 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (N.Y. 1982) (deciding that a legislative ban on government
indemnification of punitive damages guards against "unwarranted invasion of the public
purse").
15 8 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825(b) (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing public entities other
than the state to indemnify employee for punitive damages if governing body finds in its sole
discretion that employee acted within scope of duties, in good faith, without actual malice,
[Vol. 58:175
PRIVAT7_AIONAND PUN1TIVES
usually on a discretionary basis. 159 Several justifications may be advanced for
permitting such indemnification of public employees on a case-by-case basis.
and in the apparent best interests of the public entity); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-118(5)
(1988) (vesting public entity's governing body with discretion to pay or settle punitive
damages claims against one of its employees if it determines, after an open public meeting,
that such payment is in the public interest); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6116 (1989)
(notwithstanding the fact that public employees in Kansas are generally precluded from being
indemnified for punitive damages, statute authorizes such indemnification on a discretionary
basis in cases involving alleged civil rights violations); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JuD. PROC.
§ 5-403(c)(2) (1995) ( allowing local government to indemnify employee for punitive
damages, except for certain conduct involving law enforcement officers); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 466.07 (West 1994) (requiring municipality to indemnify employee liable for punitive
damages, provided that employee acted in performance of official duties and was not guilty of
malfeasance in office, willful neglect of duty, or bad faith); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:10-1, 10-
4 (West 1992) (allowing state to indemnify state employee for punitive damages if, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, the acts committed by the employee did not constitute actual
fraud, actual malice, willful misconduct, or an intentional wrong; local public entities may
indemnify their employees for punitive damages upon making similar findings); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-4-4 (Michie 1995) (obligating governmental entity to indemnify employee for
punitive damages based on federal law or law of other state, if the public employee was acting
within the scope of duties); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 9.87(B)(3) (Anderson 1990) (allowing
state to indemnify employee for punitive damages upon finding by Attorney General that
employee acted within scope of duties, without malicious purpose, bad faith, or in a wanton
or reckless manner); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-22 (1993) (establishing state fund for claims
against public entities obligated to indemnify public employee for punitive damages if
employee was acting within scope of duties, without fraud or malice, and not while under
influence of drugs or alcohol). Iowa takes a compromised approach, precluding municipalities
from directly indemnifying against judgments for punitive damages, but authorizing governing
bodies to purchase insurance for their employees and officers that would cover such
exposures. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 670.8 (West Supp. 1996).
159 In some states the issue of employee indemnification does not arise much because
punitive damages are statutorily nonrecoverable from public employees in state law tort
actions. See ARiz. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.04 (1992); IDAHo CODE § 6-918 (1996); 745
ILL. COME. STAT. ANN. 10/2-213 (West 1982) (employees of local public entities not liable
for punitive damages); MND. CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. PROC. §§ 5-321, 5-322, 5-323 (1995)
(declaring punitives nonrecoverable from municipal and county officials in contract actions);
Ms. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 1996) (disallowing punitive damages awards against
state and local employees); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.035(1) (Michie 1996) (no punitive
damages against public officials acting within scope of their employment); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 30.265(1) (1988) (requiring tort actions against public employees to be brought exclusively
against the public agency if arising out of employee's scope of public employment); W. VA.
CODE § 29-12A-7 (1992) (no punitive damages recoverable against employees of political
subdivisions); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.82(6) (West Supp. 1995) (punitive damages
unrecoverable from state employees). Federal law, however, might still expose such public
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One reason is to allow the executive branch of government that employs the
defendant civil servant a chance to rectify an aberrational judicial award of
punitives that it finds, on further examination, to be truly unfair or contrary to
the public interest. Since the government agency might be required by law or
union contract to finance an appeal by that government worker of an unjustified
punitive award, there is merit in allowing the agency to save time and expense
by paying the plaintiff the award (or a negotiated compromise of it) in lieu of
such an appeal.
The recruitment, retention, and morale of talented public employees also
can be enhanced by allowing government some leeway to spare its workers
from the financial hardship of an aberrational punitive damages award. Because
they are often engaged in highly visible services for the general public, civil
servants can be disproportionately targeted in lawsuits brought by disgruntled
citizens. Such lawsuits often include claims for punitive damages. 160 At times
those lawsuits are unjustified, but can take years or months before they are
dismissed. Given the special vulnerability of public employees to such
litigation, there is some justification in allowing the government to tell its
workers: "We will stand by you if we find that you were truly acting properly
within the scope of your duties." 161
When the defendant is a business enterprise contracted by the government
to carry out a particular task rather than an individual public employee, the
equitable reasons that may justify the occasional indemnification of a
government worker from punitive damages seem less palpable. The contractor
may well have many other customers. If it does, the contractor would not have
the same dependency on the government as do individual civil servants who
often devote their careers to public service. Conceivably, a private enterprise
qualified to take on the government's work might be more interested in bidding
for that work if it can be assured that it will have the government's indemnity
employees to punitive damages liability, such as in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994). See supra note 125.
160 Some procedural measures have been adopted to minimize the chances that a jury
might peg punitive damages against an indemnifiable public employee at an excessive figure,
in the expectation that a deep-pocket government agency will be picking up the tab. Under the
California indemnification scheme, for example, the jury may not be told that a public entity
may be paying all or part of a punitive award against one of its employees, nor can the
plaintiff in such a case put on proofs revealing the extent of the public entity's assets. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825(b)(3) (West Supp. 1996); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6116(d)
(1989) (prohibiting disclosure at trial of possibility that governmental entity may pay punitive
damages on behalf of its employee sued for civil rights violations).
161 However, punitive indemnification of public employees should not be automatic, lest
the retributive and deterrent purposes of those sanctions be forsaken in those instances where
they are justified.
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protection from punitive damages.162 Nevertheless, there normally should be
sufficient incentives for enough private firms to enter into government contracts
without maling them such extraordinary promises, particularly since those
firms are already facing punitive damages exposures in their regular private
sector work. Moreover, the argument that punitive damages exposure might
discourage companies from bidding on public contracts also would logically
extend to the similarly discouraging impact of enforcing criminal laws against
government contractors. Yet there surely is no reason to immunize such
companies from penal statutes forbidding corruption, theft, and the like on
162 Both the majority and the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court in Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996) and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v.
City of Northlake, 116 S. CL 2353 (1996), the recent companion cases extending to
government contractors First Amendment protections from political patronage-based
procurement decisions, expressly recognized that there are some qualitative differences
between government employees and independent contractors hired by the government. See
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348 (recognizing that independent contractors "work at a greater
remove from government officials than do most government employees" and that such
contracts generally do "not give the government the right to supervise and control the details
of how work is done"); O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2359 ("It is true that the distinction between
employees and independent contractors has deep roots in our legal tradition and often serves
as a line of demarcation for differential treatment ... .") (citation omitted). Consider also
Justice Scalia's following observations in his dissent in Umbehr:
A public employee is always an individual, and a public employee below the highest
political level.., is virtually always an individual who is not rich; the termination or
denial of a public job is the termination or denial of a livelihood. A public contractor, on
the other hand, is usually a corporation; and the contract it loses is rarely its entire
business, or even an indispensable part of its entire business.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justices split in Umbehr and O'Hare
on whether those various factual distinctions constitutionally justified treating private
contractors differently from public employees when they are terminated or denied government
work for purely political reasons. The majority in both cases concluded that government
contractors, in spite of their differing characteristics that are important for common law
purposes, nonetheless deserve the same First Amendment protection from patronage as do
regular government employees. See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348-49. As Justice O'Connor
stated for the majority, "Independent contractors appear to us to lie somewhere between the
case of government employees, who have the closest relationship with the government, and
our other constitutional conditions precedent [cases], which involve persons with less close
relationships with the government." Id. at 2350. The Court's observations reinforce my own
point: government contractors are not the same in all respects as the government itself, nor
are their workers identical to full-time government employees. The differences, I submit,
justify treating such contractors unlike public entities and public employees when it comes to
their susceptibility to punitive damages.
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public jobs. If anything, there is a greater need for such legal constraints given
the opportunities for contractors to take advantage of their position.
On balance, the pass-through problems associated with directly
indemnifying government contractors for punitive damages seem to outweigh
the potential justifications for such indemnity, at least as a general matter.163
This sort of indemnification should not be a contractual entitlement that is
routinely included in procurement agreements. If private vendors are regularly
afforded such a contractual promise of punitive indemnity, their fiscal
incentives to refrain from the kind of egregious behavior that will trigger such
damages practically evaporate. Accordingly, the law should deem such punitive
indemnity promises unenforceable as a matter of public policy. 64 Rather than
allowing punitive indemnification to be bargained for as a matter of contractual
entitlement, the law instead should repose in high level executive branch
officials (such as, for example, an Attorney General, Comptroller, or an entire
local governing body) limited, nondelegable discretion to indemnify
government contractors from a docketed civil judgment of punitive damages
only where they make specific findings that such indemnification is in the
public's best interests.1 65 This approach leaves open a window of opportunity
163 In federal contracts, "there is generally no [indemnification] coverage for losses or
claims caused by willful misconduct or lack of good faith on the part of the contractor." Grad,
supra note 137, at 478; cf. Superfind Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 9619(c)(1) (1994) (denying indemnification to environmental response action
contractors where liability resulted from the contractor's gross negligence or by intentional
misconduct); Exec. Order No. 10,789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897, § I(1A)(b)(2), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 1431 (1994) (prohibiting United States from contractually agreeing to indemnify
national defense contractors for claims or losses caused by willful misconduct or a lack of
good faith). Such exclusion of instances of "misconduct," "bad faith," and "gross
negligence" from the ambit of federal indemnification loosely approximates the traditional
common law standards for awarding punitive damages. See supra notes 93-101 and
accompanying text.
164 The notion of denying government contractors indemnification of certain categories
of exposures for policy reasons is not a new one. For example, in Stencel Aero Eng'g v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977), the Supreme Court declared invalid indemnification
claims asserted against the United States by military contractors that had been found liable in
private litigation to service personnel injured by the contractor's equipment. The Court's
analysis in Stencel hinged upon the same congressionally adopted policy reasons that the
Court had previously sustained in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, (1950): i.e., that the
government ought not be liable in the courts to bear the costs of military accidents that injure
its own soldiers, sailors, and pilots. See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673. The Court also expressed
concern that the indemnification of such serviceman claims would disrupt military discipline.
See id. at 673.
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for corrective action from aberrational punitive awards that are not (or not yet)
rectified by the judiciary without unduly sacrificing the accountability goals that
are furthered in general by exposing government contractors to punitive
liability.
The problem of indirect pass-through of punitive damages-a problem
which flows from an assumption that bidders on government contracts will jack
up their prices to take into account the risks of future unindemnified punitive
damages liability-is a harder one to uncover and to address. The risks of
punitive liability are not easily quantified, and the extra sum that a bidder would
charge for bearing that risk will be virtually impossible to segregate out of its
overall bid price. Accepting the premise, however, that economically rational
bidders will in some way, ex ante, factor such risks into their prices, there still
may be ways to limit the extent that taxpayers would ultimately absorb the costs
of punitive damages assessed against government contractors.
The procurement process itself offers one avenue to guard against such
indirect pass-through of punitive damages. All other things assumed equal, a
more vigilant private firm that stimulates its employees to adhere to basic legal
norms and to refrain from the kind of outrageous behavior that can trigger
punitive damages will be able to underbid competing firms that are more prone
to such liabilities. 166 Additionally, recidivist firms with a track record of being
repeatedly held liable for punitive damages on account of a number of instances
of wrongful conduct might also be debarred, suspended, or otherwise
disqualified (or given lesser preference in discretionary bidding scenarios) from
obtaining government contracts. 167 Such past experiences or misconduct may
165 The statutory provisions in New Jersey and Ohio that vest the Attorneys General of
those states with narrow discretion to indemnify public employees for punitive damages offer
useful models in this regard. See supra note 158.
166 By way of illustration, suppose that private firms "A" and "B" are bidding on a
government contract. Disregarding punitive damages for the moment, assume that Firms A
and B would each perform the contract for the same baseline costs of X dollars. Suppose
further that Firm B, because of its overall methods of doing business, is more prone than
Firm A to engage in the sort of wrongful conduct that would warrant punitive damages
liability and that the extra costs associated with that differential in punitive risk are quantified
at Ydollars. Lastly, assume that both Firms A and B would need a profit margin of Z dollars
to be motivated to take on the contract. In this "equal-baseline costs" scenario, Firm A should
prove to be the low bidder on the contract because its total costs ($Y + $Z) are less than those
for Firm B ($X + $Y + $Z).
167 For example, a federal acquisition regulation, FAR 9.104-1(d), states that a
prospective contractor with the United States must have "a satisfactory record of integrity and
business ethics." 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1(d) (1995). The regulation does not define the term
"integrity," but has been successfully invoked at times by the government to disqualify
bidders with a past record of serious criminal or statutory violations. See generally MCBRIDE,
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bespeak a lack of integrity or responsibility on the part of the bidding firm.
Further, a punitive damages award levied against an existing vendor could
provoke an otherwise complacent government agency to respond by
terminating (to the extent permitted, of course, under the terms of the contract)
that vendor, thereby depriving the vendor of the full anticipated benefits of its
business relationship with the government.
One possible consequence of these suggested measures to constrain the
pass-through of punitive damages liability is that some private firms may refuse
to bid on work for the government because they do not want to bear such
punitive risks. A related possibility is that they will bid only at much higher
prices to account for those risks. In either scenario, the government may find
that it is not feasible to contract out the work, or that government can do the
work more cheaply in-house by virtue of its immunity from punitive damages.
Such outcomes, however, do not thwart public policy. Privatization, which is
often pursued to save the taxpayers money, can only be in the public interest if
the firms hired by government are held accountable for their work. If the price
of that accountability makes contracting out a government function to private
firms too expensive, then perhaps that function should not be privatized in the
first place. A seemingly low bid on a contract for public services could mask a
bidder's proclivity to perform those services in a slipshod manner. 168 By
supra note 9, §§ 10.190, 10.200, 10.240, and cases cited therein. Likewise, the FAR also
requires bidders to have "a satisfactory performance record." 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1(c) (1995).
Accordingly, deficient past performance also can disqualify a prospective bidder. See
MCBRIDE, supra note 8, § 10.190 and cases cited therein. In February 1997, Vice President
Gore announced that federal regulations would soon be issued that, for the first time, would
disqualify certain companies that have engaged in past labor law violations from bidding on
federal contracts. See Steven Greenhouse, Gore Informs Labor of New Restrictions on U.S.
Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at Al. In the same vein, a firm that has been
repeatedly held liable for punitive damages to persons that it injured in its past work for
government agencies conceivably might be deemed to lack sufficient integrity or a
"satisfactory performance record" to enable it to bid on new public contracts.
168 Whether such a contractor that runs its operations more cheaply than its competitors
will actually obtain the government's business may depend on the magnitude of that
contractor's proclivity to be held liable for punitive damages. Returning to the hypothetical
previously posed, see supra note 166, suppose that Firm B's costs of performing the contract
are $W less than the costs that Firm A would incur ($X) if awarded the government contract.
Again, presume that beth firms would want to make the same amount of minimum profit ($Z)
on the contract. If the risks of punitive damages are ignored, then Finn B would be the low
bidder, because its total price ($X + $Z - $R) would be less than Firm A's total price ($Y +
$2). However, if Firm B is more prone to engage in conduct that would justify punitive
damages than Firm A, Firm B's apparent price advantage over Firm A will lessen and might
even disappear. If, for example, we again assign the sum of $Yto the enhanced punitive risk
associated with Firm B, then Firm B's total price would be $X + $Z - $W + $Y, while Firm
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refusing to immunize or indemnify government contractors from punitive
damages, we can better evaluate the costs and benefits of privatizing public
services-with a decision calculus that does not forfeit the public's vital interest
in accountability.
Even if some degree of fiscal pass-through of punitive liability costs to
taxpayers is inevitable, the exemplary potential of such awards should not be
underestimated. Private firms doing business with the government, particularly
through contracts that attract substantial public attention because of their size or
the visibility of the service provided, should loathe the adverse publicity
engendered by a punitive damages award. Such verdicts can tarnish the
A's price would remain at $X + $Z. Whether Firm B would still be the low bidder would
thus depend upon whether the savings that it can achieve over Firm A in its performance costs
($) are greater than the extra sum that it must charge ($I) to take into account its higher
propensity to be liable for punitive damages. In some instances (i.e., where $Y exceeds $Mi),
Firm B will need to charge a higher overall price than Firm A to take into account its greater
risks of punitive exposure. Even in those instances where Firm B would still be the low
bidder (i.e., where $W exceeds $1), the "spread" between its price and Firm A's price may
narrow to such a degree that the government may choose to opt for Firm A over Firm B, at
least in procurement scenarios where the agency has the legal discretion to make an award
based on other factors in addition to price.
In offering these simplified hypothetical calculations that attempt to factor punitive
damages into the mix of price considerations for government procurement, I am mindful of
the descriptive and prescriptive limits of any economic analysis. Compare Ric~aD PosNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIs OF LAw (3d ed. 1988) (explaining and extolling the virtues of the
application of economic principles to legal reasoning) with Frank J. Vandall, Judge Posner's
Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY L.J. 383 (1986) (identifying various
problems with applying economic theory to tort law, including, inter alia, economic
assumptions about human values, market externalities, transactions costs, and wealth
maximization motives) and C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law,
5 Pur.. & PuB. AFF. 3, 48 (1975) (criticizing law and economics methodologies as "biased in
favor of the rich and productive, exploitative claimants"). Indeed, it may be misleading to
assume in my hypothetical that both Firm A and Firm B will "perform" a government
contract on an equally satisfactory basis when Firm B is more apt than Firm A to engage in
egregious conduct that injures members of the public while doing that outsourced work. The
notion of competent performance by a government contractor ideally should include an
expectation that the provider will not willfully, wantonly, or otherwise abusively treat the
citizens that it is supposed to be serving. As noted above, however, the government agency
that hires the contractor may fail to assure such results through its contract negotiation and
oversight efforts. That shortcoming justifies giving the public consumers of the outsourced
function a degree of economic leverage to curtail such contractor abuses. Through the court's
imposition of punitive damages, a government vendor that adopts an indifferent "we're-going-
to-take-the-cheapest-way-out" attitude, such as the defendant road contractor in Lemond
Construction, Co. v. Wheeler, 669 So. 2d 855, 863 (Ala. 1995), may forfeit any competitive
edge it would have enjoyed over other more responsible bidders. See supra note 6
19971
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
enterprise's public image, potentially diminishing its relations with its investors,
its other customers (especially those in the public sector), and its employees. A
publicized verdict for punitive damages against a government contractor might
also stimulate other litigation against the firm if it has committed similar
misconduct in its private business. In turn, the government contractor may well
choose to be more careful in conforming its activities to the boundaries of the
law, whether it is working in the public or private sectors. These compliance
benefits are desirable on their own accord, even if taxpayers do end up directly
or indirectly defraying a chunk of the contractor's punitive damage exposures.
This is by no means to suggest that punitive damages are an antidote to all
of the accountability problems raised by privatization. As acknowledged above,
the law of punitive damages has not been uniformly administered in practice
with constitutional, let alone scientific, precision. Civil juries and judges at
times will over-penalize less insidious conduct and under-penalize more
egregious behavior. Some contractors may be indifferent to the threat of
punitive liability, despite rational incentives for them to avoid such costs by
behaving responsibly. Moreover, the government may fail in the procurement
process to protect the public treasury sufficiently from the pass-through of
punitive exposures.
In spite of these imperfections, punitive damages liability can aid in the
massive task of monitoring public services rendered by private contractors. We
would be mistaken to rely on the government alone to watch over important
outsourced functions for the public at large. Opponents of privatization should
take some solace in keeping such a monitoring device in the hands of the
citizens who regularly use or deal with a privatized service. Proponents of
privatization, on the other hand, should recognize that exposing government
contractors to punitive damages simply is treating such private firms in the
same fashion that they are treated under the law when they are working in the
private sector. And since punitive damages are, by definition, to be imposed
only for the most egregious forms of misconduct, the remedy should not unduly
tie the hands of law-abiding government contractors in their efforts to
experiment responsibly with ways to conduct public services more efficiently.
V. CONCLUSION
As we continue to sort out which activities of modem government can and
should be privatized through contracts and how best to accomplish such
privatization, we must bear in mind the importance of overseeing the private
firms that step in to handle those public functions. Those firms are engaged,
after all, in the people's business, even if their economic mission is to earn
profits while doing so. Monitoring by government itself is not likely to prove
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sufficient to keep public contractors accountable. The government's efforts to
police its contractors should be augmented by the members of society who are
affected by the work of those contractors. If a government contractor causes
harm by deviating from societal norms, then it ordinarily should be held
accountable in the courts to the persons that it has injured.
To advance these ends, those who are injured by willful, wanton, or other
extreme misconduct by a government contractor should be allowed to obtain
not only compensatory redress, but also the well-established civil remedy of
punitive damages that is designed to punish and deter such wrongful behavior.
The status-based immunity that traditionally shields most public entities from
punitive damages should not be stretched further to immunize government
contractors likewise from exemplary liability. Nor should the government
routinely indemnify its contractors from those exposures. Instead, the usual
rules of law that can make egregious private actors literally pay for their
wrongdoing with a civil sanction also should be applied to private actors when
they flagrantly cause harm to others while under contract to the government.
That is the proper role of punitive damages. By leaving such exemplary
measures intact, we shall increase the chances in an era of privatization that
government contractors will honor their obligations to the state, and, as
importantly, to the public that they were hired to serve.
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